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40 Wis. 575

Sage v. Strong

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Decided August 15, 1876

Wisconsin Supreme Court · decided 1876-08-15

In October, .1874, tbe circuit court rendered a judgment for a divorce in an action between tbe plaintiff, Mrs. Sage, and her husband, A.W. Sage, and adjudged that said A.W. Sage pay to tbe plaintiff, for the support of their minor children (the custody of whom was given to her), one hundred and twenty dollars per annum, payable in quarterly installments on the first days of November, February, May and August in each year.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“that a surety for the performance of a contract or obligation is discharged if such contract or obligation be materially changed without his consent.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Gritz Harvestore, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1876-08-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently June 1986

2 federal appellate · 10 state decisions

40187618801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Lyon, J.

¶1The instrument upon which this action is brought, was signed by the defendant as surety for A. W. Sage. It is so stipulated in the case. The legal effect of the instrument is, that the defendant undertook that Sage should perform the requirements of the original judgment in the divorce suit in respect to the payment of allowances. The only. question presented for our determination on this appeal is, Did the modification of that judgment release him from-such undertaking? We think this question must be answered in the affirmative. The defendant’s liability is limited by the original judgment; and that, if not destroyed, has been very materially altered without his consent. The rule is elementary, and of almost universal application, that a surety for the performance of a contract or obligation is discharged if such contract or obligation be materially changed without his consent. That rule is applicable here. The defendant became surety for the payment, to the plaintiff of thirty dollars on, the 1st day of May, 1875, pursuant to a judgment which re*578quired A. W. Sage to pay lier that sum ou that day. Before the payment became due, the court, at the instance of the plaintiff and without the consent of the defendant, so modified the judgment that no sum was due her on that day, but a larger sum became due to her from A. W. Sage on another day. This left no judgment to which the undertaking of the defendant is applicable, and necessarily relieved him from liability.

¶2Had the last judgment been merely that the former husband of the plaintiff pay her a sum additional to the sum allowed in the original judgment, leaving such original judgment undisturbed, it is probable the defendant would remain liable as surety. But that course was not pursued.

¶3This case is not taken out of the general rule above stated by the fact that the defendant entered into the agreement with knowledge that the court had power to alter the judgment for alimony. Any person who becomes surety for the performance of an obligation does so with knowledge that such obligation' may lawfully be altered by the principals. Nevertheless if they do alter it without his consent, he is discharged. And so it must be if a secured judgment be altered without the consent of the surety.

¶4We conclude that the defendant is released from liability by the modification of the original judgment; and hence, that the complaint should have been dismissed.

¶5By the Gowrt. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.

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