40 Wis. 2d 103 - Finger v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In State v. Tuttle (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 147 , 124 N. W. 2d 9 , we pointed out that this court can properly review the sentence of a lower court. We have stated, however, that the exercise of this court’s power to review the sentence imposed by a trial court is ‘governed by a strong policy against interference with the discretion of the trial court.’ Nelson v. State (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 797, 820, 821 , 151 N. W. 2d 694 . “In Jung v. State (1966), 32 Wis. 2d 541 , 145 N. W. 2d 684 , this court set forth the criteria to be used in the review of a trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing. We stated: “ ‘In reviewing a sentence for an abuse of discretion, we start with the presumption that the trial court acted reasonably and with the requirement that the complainant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record for the sentence complained of. Consequently, in the instant case there must be a showing that in determining the sentence of Jung the trial court based its determination upon factors not proper in or irrelevant to sentencing, or was influenced by motives inconsistent with impartiality.’ Jung v. State, supra, page 548.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 44 Wis. 2d 266 - State v. Harling · 47 Wis. 2d 801 - Riley v. State

2. ““While the state must prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, on appeal this court’s review is limited to determining whether the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by a jury was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reversal is requiréd only when the evidence considered most favorably to the state and the conviction is so insufficient in probative valué and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of facts acting reasonably could be convinced to that degree of certitude which the law defines as beyond a reasonable doubt.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 69 Wis. 2d 587 - Gilbertson v. State · 44 Wis. 2d 138 - Sartin v. State

3. ““In essence, what the defendant herein is saying is that the judge had to review the sufficiency of the evidence in order to reach his finding and that to ask him to review it again is to require the trial judge to do a useless act. Nevertheless, we conclude that a motion for a new trial or to set aside a finding is not a useless act even though the trial is before the court. “The fact that, in the mind of counsel, a trial judge adopts an erroneous view of the law or makes a faulty appraisal of the evidence in his initial findings does not, ipso facto, mean that he will persist in error, if error there be, when the viewpoint of counsel is called to his attention. There are numerous instances in which judicial errors have been called to the attention of the trial judge on motions after verdict where the judges of this state have not hesitated to correct their own errors. We have frequently taken the position that a trial judge should be given the opportunity to correct his own errors as well as those that may have been committed by a jury. As has been stated in 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, p. 43, sec. 17, referring to the practice in other jurisdictions: “ ‘. . . it was the duty of counsel to give the trial court an opportunity, by motion for a new trial, to correct whatever errors it may have made in respect to matters which may properly be made the grounds of such a motion.’ (Emphasis supplied.) “Even in the nonjury case a motion for new trial not only secures a re-examination of”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 41 Wis. 2d 245 - Massen v. State