Carroll v. Konits’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
6 district · 42 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 48 later decisions — most recently August 2020 · most notably Breslin v. Powell (2011), Suter v. Stuckey (2007)
6 district · 42 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Administration · Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A. · Attorney General v. Johnson · Lloyd v. General Motors Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(b) Filing and service of certificate of qualified expert— Unless the sole issue in the claim is lack of informed consent: (l)(i) 1 ... a claim or action filed after July 1, 1986, shall be dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant or plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert ... attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury, within 90 days from the date of the complaint; .... (3)(i) The attorney representing each party, or the party proceeding pro se, shall file the appropriate certificate with a report of the attesting expert attached.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“consistent with the General Assembly's intent to avoid non-meritorious claims”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. As the Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature’s intent. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment under consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia— among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.