400 Pa. Super. 25 - Commonwealth v. Strunk’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

56 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) General Rule. — Whenever a person is convicted or is adjudicated delinquent or is admitted to any preadjudication program for a violation of section ... 6308 (relating to the purchase, consumption, possession or transportation of liquor or malt or brewed beverages) ..., the court, including a court not of record ... shall order the operating privileges of the person suspended. A copy of the order shall be transmitted to the Department of Transportation. (b) Duration of suspension. — When the department suspends the operating privilege of a person under subsection (a), the duration of the suspension shall be as follows: (2) For the second offense, a period of one year from the date of suspension____”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Krall v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing · Meredith v. Commonwealth

2. “Indeed it is quite plausible and even probable that the legislature may have intended section 6310.4 to promote the goals of deterrence and punishment, i.e. to discourage the possession and consumption of alcohol by underage individuals. It is undisputed that underage drinking and driving results in a high number of fatalities in the United States each year. See Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 Dick.L.Rev. 649, 657 (1988). It follows, therefore, that if underage drinking could be eliminated, thousands of lives could be saved each year. With these premises in mind, we note that prior to section 6310.4's enactment, those under 21 years of age convicted of possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages were often subject only to a fine, in some cases as low as $25.00. The legislature may have believed that in many cases such fines were either paid by the violator's parents or were so minimal as to serve neither punitive nor deterrent functions. Thus, the legislature may have sought to impose a penalty which would deter and punish any offender, regardless of the financial penalty involved. Clearly, the penalty of a 90-day license suspension advances both of these goals. We find, therefore, that both deterrence and punishment represent legitimate state interests, and indeed may have constituted the legislative goals underlying the challenged enactment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bennett

3. “The first step is to consider whether the challenged statute seeks to promote any legitimate state interest or public value. Meier [v. Anderson ], 692 F.Supp. [546] at 552 [(E.D.Pa.1988)]; Mays [v. Scranton City Police Dept. ] 503 F.Supp. 1255 at 1261 [(M.D.Pa.1980)] (quoting Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 , 101 S.Ct. 361 , 66 L.Ed.2d 219 (1980)). The second prong of the analysis mandates an evaluation of whether the statute is reasonably related to accomplishing the articulated state interest or interests. Meier, 692 F.Supp. at 552. See, e.g., Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 20-23 , 7 A.2d 466, 471 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 , 60 S.Ct 726 , 84 L.Ed. 969 (1940) (as long as legislature acts neither arbitrarily nor capriciously, it may enact any regulation it believes is necessary to protect life, limb or property on the Commonwealth’s roadways).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Plowman v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP.