401 So. 2d 1131 - Waters v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1. In a prosecution for burglary under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979), is it necessary for the state to allege an intent to commit a specific offense? 2. Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient to prove a prima facie case of intent to commit the specific offense of theft?”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Waters · 436 So. 2d 1113 - Brown v. State

2. “Certain circumstances, unexplained, might tend to prove the intent, such as laying hold of a woman, or running after her in an attempt to do so, to establish intent to commit rape; the possession of a murderous weapon, ready for use, with other circumstances to establish the intent to kill; the possession of highly explosive material, to establish intent to commit arson; or the unexplained taking or attempting to take personal property, as evidence of intent to commit larceny. Some courts have held that from the mere breaking and entry the intent to commit larceny may be inferred. State v. Worthen, 111 Iowa 267 , 82 N.W. 910 ; Moseley v. State, 92 Miss. 250 , 45 South. 833 . If such a presumption is warranted, which we do not hold, it is such a presumption as would prevent a conviction of intent to commit any other felony, in the absence of facts rebutting that presumption, and raising the presumption of intent to commit a different offense. It is a well-settled rule that, in order to convict on circumstantial evidence, the facts must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused of the offense charged. In this case the accused was charged with an intent to commit a specific act. Only the breaking and entering, and the presence of a woman and children in the room, were proven. This does not exclude the hypothesis that he intended to commit murder, larceny, arson, or any other felony. The circumstantial evidence in this case falls sh”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Waters

3. “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 436 So. 2d 1113 - Brown v. State