Smith v. Chanel, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
402 F.2d 562 · 1968
Citation profile
46 federal appellate · 13 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 125 later decisions — most recently August 2018 · most notably Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. (1999), H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc. (1989)
46 federal appellate · 13 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (§ 32 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (§ 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act))
Relies on Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. · Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. · Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. · Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co. · William Warner Co v. Eli Lilly & Co
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 125 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ . . . one who has copied an un-patented product sold under a trademark may use the trademark in his advertising to identify the product he has copied . . . and may not be enjoined under either the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (1964), or the common law of unfair competition, so long as it does not contain misrepresentations or create a reasonable likelihood that purchasers will be confused as to the source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser’s product.” Smith, supra, 402 F.2d at 563 .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“protection should also be extended to the trademark's commercially more important function of embodying consumer good will created through extensive, skillful, and costly advertising,”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The second major argument for extended trademark protection is that even in the absence of confusion as to source, use of the trademark of another “creates a serious threat to the uniqueness and distinctiveness” of the trademark, and “if continued would create a risk of making a generic or descriptive term of the words” of which the trademark is composed. The contention has little weight in the context of this case. Appellants do not use appellees’ trademark as a generic term. They employ it only to describe appellees’ product, not to identify their own. They do not label their product “Ta’Ron’s Chanel No. 5,” as they might if appellees’ trademark had come to be the common name for the product to which it is applied. Appellants’ use does not challenge the distinctiveness of appellees’ trademark, or appellees’ exclusive right to employ that trademark to indicate source or sponsorship. For reasons already discussed, we think appellees are entitled to no more. The slight tendency to carry the mark into the common language which even this use may have is outweighed by the substantial value of such use in maintenance of effective competition.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.