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← 402 F.2d 676 - Watts v. United States

Watts v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

402 F.2d 676 · 1968

Citation profile

64
cited by 64 later decisions
4
cited 4 times by the Supreme Court
9
states following
May 2011
most recently cited

39 federal appellate · 2 district · 12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 64 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2011 · most notably Watts v. United States (1969), Rogers v. United States (1975)

39 federal appellate · 2 district · 12 state decisions

360196819701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 871 (Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000)

Relies on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · Morissette v. United States · Cantwell v. State of Connecticut · National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. Y Button · Roth v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “`knowingly and willfully... [making a] threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “made the alleged threat with specific intent to execute it.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “. . . a threat is knowingly made if the maker of it comprehends the meaning of the words uttered by him, and a threat is willfully made if in addition to comprehending his words, the maker voluntarily and intentionally utters the words as a declaration of an apparent determination to carry out the threat. 15 However, before you convict a defendant under this statute, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made a statement, either written or oral, in a context and under such circumstances that a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by persons hearing or reading it as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President of the United States, and you must be further convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not the result of mistake, duress or coercion; however, the statute does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat to kill or harm the President.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.