Pinney Md’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 district · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “While § 332(e)(3)(A) is unclear as to what precisely constitutes a barrier to entry into the PCS market, we conclude that the relief sought by the Naquin plaintiffs (a headset requirement) is not such a barrier. To begin with, the PCS market is a market for wireless service. Wireless service providers use base stations and MTSOs to create a network of coverage, a network that wireless telephone users generally pay a fee to access. The FCC licenses portions of the radio spectrum to wireless service providers so they can provide PCS coverage, see 47 C.F.R. § 24.1 (a), (b), and one of the main requirements for the grant of a license is that the licensee must construct enough base stations to provide coverage to the area for which it receives a license. 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.103 , 24.203. Accordingly, in order for state law to constitute a barrier to entry, it must, at a minimum, obstruct or burden a wireless service provider’s ability to provide a network of wireless service coverage.... A headset requirement for wireless telephones would not constitute a barrier to entry into the PCS market because wireless telephones are only used to access a wireless service provider’s network of coverage; the telephones themselves do not provide the actual coverage.... Because the relief sought by the Naquin plaintiffs would not be a barrier for wireless service providers seeking to enter the PCS market, § 332(c)(3)(A) does not expressly preempt the claims of the Naquin plaintiffs.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. New Cingular Wireless PCS v. Sussex County Board of Adjustment · 578 F. Supp. 2d 740 - Farina v. Nokia

2. “specific issue of the permissible amount of RF radiation from wireless telephones” nor indicated that its objective was”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Murray v. Motorola, Inc. · 578 F. Supp. 2d 740 - Farina v. Nokia

3. “The district' court erred by not recognizing that its inquiry was limited by the well-pleaded complaint rule. It should have considered only whether a disputed question of federal law is an essential element of one of the well-pleaded state claims. See Franchise Tax Bd. [of Cal. v. Constr. Laborer’s Vacation Trust], 463 U.S. [1,] 13, 103 S.Ct. 2841 , 77 L.Ed.2d 420 [ (1983) ]. The district court went beyond this restricted inquiry and in effect anticipated (1) that Nokia would raise the affirmative defense that the state law claims are preempted by the [Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 15 et seq. (“FCA”) ] and federal RF radiation standards and (2) that the Pinney plaintiffs would be called upon to rebut that defense. The cases could be decided, the court concluded, only by resolving whether the claims are preempted by the FCA and the federal RF radiation standards. Even if that is so, a preemption defense “that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 , 106 S.Ct. 3229 , 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). Again, “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption,” even if the complaint begs the assertion of the defense, and even if “the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14 , 103 S.Ct. 2841 , 77 L.Ed.2d 420 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 578 F. Supp. 2d 740 - Farina v. Nokia