Commonwealth v. Dias’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It appears that [Justice Byron on the second motion for new trial] viewed the arraignment judge’s order [requesting a competency examination] as creating a substantial question of lack of competence at the time of trial which could be rebutted only by the hearing and find ings required by G.L. c. 123, § 15. We disagree that the facts of this case and the relevant law warrant such a conclusion and, therefore, conclude that the order granting a new trial was an error of law. See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 , 491 N.E.2d 246 (1986). The defendant was arraigned in June, 1974. The reasons for the arraignment judge’s order do not appear in the record, but we assume the existence of “a substantial question of possible doubt” at that time. Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. [393, 399, 471 N.E.2d 353 (1984) (quoting Rhay v. White, 385 F.2d 883, 886 [9th Cir.1967]) ]. However, the defendant was tried more than fifteen months later. Nothing in the record of that trial indicated that, in October, 1975, he lacked “ ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and ... a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). At no point did the trial judge’s “observations of the defendant’s demeanor and behavior at the trial,” Commonwealth v. Crowley, supra at 399, 471 N.E.2d 353 , lead him to question the defendan”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 156 F. Supp. 2d 104 - Dias v. Maloney