Parker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(ii) An application for a search warrant may contain a request that the search warrant authorize the executing law enforcement officer to enter the building, apartment, premises, place, or thing to be searched without giving notice of the officer’s authority or purpose, on the grounds that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that, without the authorization: 1. the property subject to seizure may be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted; or 2. The life or safety of the executing officer or another person may be endangered. (iii) If warranted by application as described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, authorize the executing law enforcement officer to enter the building, apartment, premises, place, or thing to be searched without giving notice of the officer’s authority or purpose.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 184 Md. App. 535 - Ford v. State

2. “[U]nder the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence [derived from a 'no-knock' search warrant may be] excludable.... This is a very limited decision based exclusively upon Maryland non-constitutional law and procedure.” (Emphasis in original)); Davis, supra, 383 Md. 394 , 859 A.2d 1112 ; Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230 , 703 A.2d 160 (1997); Sheetz v. City of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208 , 553 A.2d 1281 (1989); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224 , 522 A.2d 1348 (1987); Raker, 77 Miss. L.J. at 411-14. But see Parker, 402 Md. at 411-12 , 936 A.2d 862 (Raker, J., dissenting) (”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 180 Md. App. 210 - Padilla v. State

3. “"simply because a Maryland constitutional provision [or statute or common law principle] is in pari materia with a federal one or has a federal counterpart, does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart. Furthermore, cases interpreting and applying a federal constitutional provision are only persuasive authority with respect to the similar Maryland provision.” (Emphasis in original).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Marshall v. State