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402 So. 2d 174

Camelo v. Camelo

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Decided June 29, 1981

Louisiana Court of Appeal · decided 1981-06-29

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1983

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““A. In all cases of separation and divorce, and change of custody after an original award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband or the wife, or to both jointly by agreement of both the husband and wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children; however, an award of joint custody may be granted only when the husband and wife are both domiciled in the state of Louisiana. If either parent changes his or her domicile to another state, the other may petition for sole custody. No preference shall be given on the basis of the sex of the parent in cases where custody is awarded to only one parent. Such custody hearing may be held in private chambers of the judge.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 417 So. 2d 495 - Babin v. Babin

Relies on 390 So. 2d 1325 - Bordelon v. Bordelon · 383 So. 2d 1231 - Cleeton v. Cleeton · 377 So. 2d 417 - Thornton v. Thornton

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-06-29

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PONDER, Judge.

¶1Mrs. Carlyn Hughes Camelo has appealed the award of child custody to her former husband.

¶2The sole issue is the propriety of that award. We affirm.

¶3Mrs. Camelo was granted custody of the minor children, Christian and John Camelo in the separation. The divorce continued this award.

¶4After hearing a rule for change, the trial court gave custody to the father but prohibited his taking the children from Louisiana. On appeal Mrs. Camelo contends that the trial court erred in finding that the father was the better guardian and that it was in the best interest of the minor children to grant their custody to him.

¶5Mrs. Camelo met and corresponded with an inmate at St. Gabriel Prison. Upon his release from prison, the couple lived together out of wedlock. During this period, although John Camelo, appellant’s sixteen year old son, was in Mrs. Camelo’s legal custody, he began living with his paternal grandparents. The ten year old daughter, Christian, lived with her mother and Mr. Ryder when they first began to cohabit but was sent to her father’s house when the affair began to deteriorate.

¶6*175The record further shows that for several years the mother had not been able to provide a stable environment for her child, Christian. She had little or no regular income of her own other than the child support payments and was therefore unable to provide wholesome living arrangements.

¶7It is true that Mrs. Camelo has recently ceased to live with Mr. Ryder, that she is presently employed, or about to be employed, by her sister and brother-in-law, and that she has started to attend church. However, these major changes in her life occurred shortly prior to the hearing on the custody matter.

¶8Mr. Camelo, although he had had a longstanding, respectable job at a bank, has recently left his job to follow the career of a professional poker player in Las Vegas. Despite this, however, it was shown that the home Mr. Camelo could provide had been stable, loving and religious for a period of years, and that his present wife is regularly employed. Although his choice of career is unusual, it is not illegal; and the record reveals that the family income is adequate.

¶9Louisiana Civil Code Article 157 (as amended in 1979) establishes the standard to be used in determining the award of permanent custody. It states, in pertinent part:

“In all cases of separation and divorce, and changes of custody after an original award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children; without any preference being given on the basis of the sex of the parent.”

¶10The trial court is in a better position to determine the best interest of the child, based upon its closer view of the conduct and character of the parties. Traylor v. Traylor, 388 So.2d 70 (La.App. 1st 1980); Bride v. Thom, 378 So.2d 152 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1979); Howard v. Howard, 339 So.2d 1275 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976). The environment under which the children have been living is a factor to be considered. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 390 So.2d 1325 (La. 1980); see also Dickey v. Dickey, 383 So.2d 808 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1980); Thornton v. Thornton, 377 So.2d 417 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1979). The trial court may consider the fact that the major changes have only recently occurred in the appellant’s lifestyle, which time has not yet proven to be of a permanent nature. See Thompson v. Thompson, 382 So.2d 1036 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1980).

¶11The conclusion reached by the trial court in child custody cases is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Bordelon v. Bordelon, supra; Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So.2d 1231, on rehearing, (La. 1980); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 393 So.2d 381 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1980). We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

¶12For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of appeal are to be borne by appellant.

¶13AFFIRMED.

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