Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

402 So. 2d 386

Docket No. 57920.

State v. Werner

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert K. WERNER and Jack E. Carlson, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided June 25, 1981.

Rehearing Denied September 8, 1981.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1981-06-25

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently March 1999 · most notably 740 So. 2d 20 - Woods v. State (1999), 414 So. 2d 998 - Dickerson v. State (1982)

32 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(3) The state attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who is convicted of a violation of this section and who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principals... . The judge hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if he finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance.”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including State v. Bateman, 499 So. 2d 63 - Madden v. State

“in the foregoing statute is not unconstitutionally vague in vesting the prosecutor with unbridled discretion when engaging in so-called”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Stone v. State, 557 So. 2d 236 - State v. Venegas

Relies on Santobello v. New York · Bordenkircher v. Hayes · 395 So. 2d 514 - State v. Benitez

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-06-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*387 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, and Janet Reno, State's Atty. and Arthur Joel Berger, Asst. State's Atty., Miami, for appellant.

¶2Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Karen M. Gottlieb, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for appellee Robert K. Werner.

¶3Martin Lemlich, Miami Beach, for appellee Jack E. Carlson.

¶4ENGLAND, Justice.

¶5Robert K. Werner and Jack E. Carlson were charged by information with trafficking in cocaine in violation of section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1979). This appeal comes to us under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution (1972), from an order of the trial court granting their motions to dismiss the charges against them and declaring the statute unconstitutional.

¶6All but one of the issues presented by this appeal were resolved against Werner and Carlson in State v. Benitez,395 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1981), and State v. Yu,400 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1981). The one unresolved issue they raise is whether the term "may" in section 893.135(3) is unconstitutionally vague, since it vests the prosecutor with unbridled discretion when engaging in so-called "post-conviction information bargaining." Subsection (3) provides that "[t]he state attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who is convicted of a violation of this section and who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principals." Werner and Carlson claim that this provision leaves open the possibility that a prosecutor might secure "substantial assistance" from the defendant, and yet not live up to his side of the bargain by moving for a reduction or suspension of the sentence. While their concerns may be sincere, they do not provide a constitutional basis to invalidate the enactment.

¶7State attorneys are "the prosecuting officer[s] of all trial courts" under our constitution[1], and as such must have broad discretion in performing their duties. Discretion to initiate the post-conviction information bargaining process is inherent in the prosecutorial function. Absent a clear constitutional violation in a particular factual context, we refuse to intrude on the prosecutorial function by holding subsection (3) unconstitutional on its face.

¶8Additionally, section 893.135 does not directly abrogate the substantive rules of law governing plea bargaining and plea arrangements[2], and these rules should be followed, to the extent they can in a post-conviction *388 context, by the parties and the trial judge. Good faith compliance with rules governing the plea bargaining process will prevent prosecutorial overreaching and alleviate any possible constitutional infirmities which might plague the unique procedure established by subsection (3).

¶9The order of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

¶10It is so ordered.

¶11SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶12[1] Art. V, § 17, Fla. Const.

¶13[2] See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes,434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); Santobello v. New York,404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.170 & 3.171.

/402/so2d/386 · .json · Public domain