Rozier v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Waters · 417 So. 2d 1129 - Van Teamer v. State

2. “We do note with interest that while section 810.07 attempts to make stealth and lack of consent an evidentiary equivalent of proof of an intent to commit an offense in a structure, that statute does not make those two facts prima facie evidence of intent to commit a particular crime, such as theft. As long as the “general to particular” rule is applied to the element of intent in burglary cases, requiring the State to allege and prove the accused’s intent to commit a particular crime, the statutory presumption created by section 810.07, Florida Statutes, relating as it does only to a prima facie case as to an intent to commit an offense generally, will be of little or no value to the State because it will be insufficient to carry a burden of proof as to intent to commit a particular crime. In view of the substantial authority cited above which requires the State to allege and prove the specific offense intended in a burglary case, we do not feel we can now hold otherwise. Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the charging document as distinguished from proof at trial. The solution to this problem is either for the Florida Supreme Court to rule that the “general to particular” rule is not applicable to the intent element of statutory burglary or for the legislature to amend section 810.07, Florida Statutes, to provide that proof of stealth and lack of consent constitutes prima facie evidence of the intent to commit a ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 436 So. 2d 1113 - Brown v. State

3. “Therefore, in order to comply with the "general to particular" rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07, we hold that in alleging the crime of burglary, the state must either list the specific crime intended to be committed within the structure, or, alternatively, allege that an offense was intended to be committed therein in that the entry was gained stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant. By either mode of pleading, the defendant would be sufficiently notified in the accusatory pleading of the crime brought by the state to which he must respond.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 416 So. 2d 13 - State v. Clark