Volume 402 — United States Reports

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with the busing of students to promote integration in public schools. The Court held that busing was an appropriate remedy for the problem of racial imbalance in schools. This was done to ensure the schools would be "properly" integrated and that all students would receive equal educational opportunities regardless of their race.

East of the major highway that divides the metropolitan area of Mobile, Ala., live 94% of the area's Negro students, and the schools there are 65% Negro and 35% white. Held: The Court of Appeals decision dealing with the faculty and staff ratio is affirmed. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 401 U.S. 1, at 19—20, 91 S.Ct. 1267, at 1277—1278, 28 L.Ed.2d 554. P. 35. 2.

The Board of Education of Clarke County, Ga. Held: In compliance with its duty to convert to a unitary system, the school board properly took race into account in fixing the attendance lines. P. 41. 2. Title IV, a direction to federal officials, does not restrict state officials in assigning students within their systems. Pp. 41—42. Barresi v.

North Carolina's Anti-Busing Law, which flatly forbids assignment of any student">student on account of race or for the purpose of creating a racial balance or ratio in the schools and which prohibits busing for such purposes, held invalid as preventing implementation of desegregation plans required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 45—46. 312 F.Supp. 503, affirmed. Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Raleigh, for State Bd. of Ed. and others.

Since both parties in this section challenging a school desegregation plan seek the same result, viz., a holding that North Carolina's Anti-Busing Law is constitutional, there is no Art. III case or controversy. Additionally, on the facts of this case, no direct appeal to this Court lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. 312 F.Supp. 503, appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whiteford S. Blakeney, Charlotte, N.C., for Mrs. Robert Lee Moore and others. William J.

United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court abortion rights case, which held that the District of Columbia's abortion law banning the practice except when necessary for the health or life of the woman was not unconstitutionally vague.

The refusal of petitioner's local board to reopen his classification and pass on his conscientious objector claim, made after mailing of his induction notice but before induction, on the basis of a Selective Service regulation that permitted post-induction notice reopening only for a 'change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control,' held not unreasonable as a limitation on the time within which a local board must act…

Section 303(a)(1) of the Social Security Act requires a method of administration 'reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due.' In light of the intent of Congress to make payments available at the earliest stage of unemployment as is administratively feasible, in order to provide a substitute for wages, the language 'when due' must be construed to mean when benefits are allowed as a result of a hearing of which both parties have notice…

Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), was a case held by the United States Supreme Court, this decision showed the federal law criminalizing local loan sharking. Finding that Congress has authority to regulate local extortionate credit transactions under the Commerce Clause. This is based around the connection to organized crime and effect on the Interstate commerce.

Respondent's claims for compensation and accounting are barred by res judicata since they relate to land 'formerly owned or claimed by (the Conferderated Band of Utes) in western Colorado, ceded to (the United States) by the Act of June 15, 1880' and thus were subject to a final settlement reduced to a consent judgment, to which respondent was a party, made in 1950. Pp. 161—174. 191 Ct.Cl. 1, 423 F.2d 346, reversed. Lawrence G. Wallace, Washington, D.C. for petitioner.

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), is a criminal case heard by the United States Supreme Court, in which the Court held that the lack of legal standards by which juries imposed the death penalty was not an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause portions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan wrote that writing rules for jury death penalty decisions was beyond current human ability. The context was public and philosophical scrutiny of the unequal application of the death penalty, especially in that blacks who killed whites were much more likely to have a death penalty imposed. McGautha was superseded one year later by Furman v. Georgia.

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a final judgment in an infringement suit against a first defendant that a patent is invalid thereafter bars the patentee from relitigating the same patent against other defendants. In so ruling, the Supreme Court overruled its 1936 decision in Triplett v. Lowell, which had required mutuality of estoppel to bar such preclusion, and held that the better view was to prevent relitigating if the plaintiff had had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.

United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a postal regulation that banned the sale of adult materials was constitutionally permissible.

United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), is a United States Supreme Court decision in an in rem case on procedures following the seizure of imported obscene material. A 6–3 court held that the federal statute governing the seizures was not in violation of the First Amendment as long as the government began forfeiture proceedings within 14 days of the seizure.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court to determine and delineate several questions concerning administrative procedure in Social Security disability cases. Among the questions considered was the propriety of using physicians' written reports generated from medical examinations of a disability claimant, and whether these could constitute "substantial evidence" supportive of finding nondisability under the Social Security Act.

Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that courts cannot prohibit peaceful distribution of pamphlets, unless a heavy burden is met to justify prior restraint.

California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States decided that providing personal information at the scene of an accident does not infringe on one's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Petitioner applied in 1966 for conscientious objector status to his local Selective Service board, which advised him that his claim would… Held: Petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies jeopardized the interest of the Selective Service System, as the administrative agency responsible for classifying registrants, in developing the facts and using its expertise to assess his claims to exempt status and thus bars petitioner's defense that he was erroneously…

Pursuant to § 202(b) of the Federal Power Act, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) is empowered to direct one electric utility to… Held: Since there was substantial evidence to support the FPC's findings that benefits will accrue to respondent from the interconnection, the Court of Appeals erred in not deferring to the FPC's expert judgment. Pp. 521—529. 425 F.2d 1196, reversed and remanded. George Spiegel, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Gordon Gooch for petitioner.

District Court's order denying respondent's motion to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of records under his control in Kenya was not final and therefore not appealable, Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783; nor was it rendered an appealable temporary injunction by inclusion of a provision requiring respondent to seek permission from Kenyan authorities to remove some documents from Kenya and if such permission…

Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which provides that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts security for the amount of damages claimed by an aggrieved party and which excludes any consideration of fault or responsibility for the accident at a pre-suspension hearing held violative of procedural due process.

Held: it is quite unreasonable in our view to charge him with notice that such would be the construction of the ordinance. 'The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' United States v. Harris, supra, at 617, 74 S.Ct., at 812; Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373…

The United States brought this civil antitrust suit charging that the acquisition by Greater Buffalo Press (Buffalo) in 1955 of all the stock of International Color Printing Co. (International)… Held: The line of commerce here is the color comic supplement printing business, which includes the printing of the supplements and their sale, and the 'area of effective competition' encompasses the business of Buffalo, International, and King.

Appellee was charged by information with shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate commerce and that it 'did knowingly fail to show on the shipping papers the required classification… Held: The statute does not signal an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

Petitioner railroad brought this suit (after formal procedures of the Railway Labor Act had been exhausted) to enjoin a threatened strike by respondent Union, charging that the Union had failed to… Held: Sec. 2 First was intended to be, not just a mere exhortation, but an enforceable legal obligation on carriers and employees alike. Pp. 574—578. 2.

In this unfair labor practice proceeding under the Labor Management Relations Act respondent contended that it was not an 'employer' but came within the 'political subdivision' exemption in § 2(2) of… Held: Federal, rather than state, law governs the determination whether an entity is a 'political subdivision' of a State within the meaning of § 2(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act. NLRB v. Randolph Electric Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60. Pp. 602—604. 2.

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a local city ordinance that made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and "annoy" any passersby was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

Respondent and one Runnels were charged with committing various crimes and at their joint trial offered an alibi defense. Held: Where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and testifies in the defendant's favor, the defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and in the circumstances of this case respondent, who would have…

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Arizona's law suspending a driver's license was unconstitutional due to its conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Act under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.

The ownership of the majority of the stock of Armour & Co., a meat packer, by Greyhound Corp., which has retail food subsidiaries and accordingly engages in business that may be forbidden to Armour by the Meat Packers Consent Decree of 1920, in itself and without any evidentiary showing as to the consequences, does not violate the Decree's prohibition against Armour 'directly or indirectly * * * engaging in or carrying on' the forbidden business. Pp. 674—683. Affirmed.