United States v. Fox’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 federal appellate · 4 district · 23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““* * * a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. * * *” 384 U.S. at 477 , 86 S.Ct. at 1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 725 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Velarde v. People · State v. Butler

2. ““he didn’t have to make any statement ; that any statement that he made would be used in a court of law and he could consult an attorney prior to any question.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Lamia · 957 So. 2d 1219 - MAB v. State

3. “The majority, in holding that the words “he didn’t have to make any statement” did not sufficiently warn of Fox’s “right to remain silent,” have to resort to the farfetched supposition that “statement” “could easily be interpreted to mean that Fox did not have to make a formal statement rather than that he need not answer any questions or say anything at all.” I cannot conceive that anyone, just having been arrested, when told that he did not have to make a statement would construe this warning as relieving him of an obligation to make a formal statement akin to a press release. Such a construction, in my opinion, is highly unrealistic. To give such talismanic significance to the words “the right to remain silent” is to preclude all other forms of expression which would convey the same idea. In Miranda, the Supreme Court clearly did not wish to prescribe such a strict formula. 384 U.S. at page 484 , 86 S.Ct. at page 1633 , the Court cited a letter from the Solicitor General which was “consistent with the procedure which we delineate today” in which the Solicitor General advised the Court that the FBI warned suspects that they had “a right to say nothing,” citing as examples, Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9 Cir. 1965), rev’d on other grounds, Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and, Jackson v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 100 , 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 , 85 S.Ct. 944 , 13 L.Ed.2d 822 (1965). In”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 383 F. Supp. 986 - Young v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary