Rush v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

88 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 88 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In reviewing a circuit court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consider only the evidence contained in the record of the suppression hearing. The factual findings of the suppression court and its conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted unless clearly erroneous. We review the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. We undertake our own constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case.””

   10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Prioleau v. State · In re Darryl P.

2. “It is well established that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661 , 911 A.2d 1245 ... (2006); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688 , 861 A.2d 727 (2004). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute so that “no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.” Chow, 393 Md. at 443 , 903 A.2d 388 ; Collins, 383 Md. at 688-91 , 861 A.2d 727 . Further, whenever possible, an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisions which does not lead to unreasonable or illogical consequences. Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 663 , 911 A.2d 1245 (2006); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224 , 909 A.2d 1020 (2006). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Stoddard, 395 Md. at 661 , 911 A.2d 1245 ; Chow, 393 Md. at 443 , 903 A.2d 388 ; Collins, 383 Md. at 689 , 861 A.2d 727 . If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662-63 , 911 A.2d 1245 ; Blake, 395 Md. at 224 , 909 A.2d 1020 ; Chow, 393 Md. at 444 , 903 A.2d 388 ; Collins, 383 Md. at 691-92 , 861 A.2d 727 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 180 Md. App. 639 - Green v. N.B.S., Inc. · 180 Md. App. 606 - Eui Kim v. Council of Unit Owners for Collington Center III Condominium

3. “MERRITT: I’m gonna read your Miranda rights. Pay attention. O.K. You have the right to remain silent. Do you understand that? [THE APPELLANT]: Umhm. MERRITT: Is that yes? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes. MERRITT: Alright. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand that? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes. MERRITT: You have the right to talk to a lawyer, and have him present with you while you are being questioned. Do you understand that? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes. MERRITT: If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one mil be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish. Do you understand that? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes. MERRITT: You can decide at any time to exercise these rights, and not answer any questions or make any statements. Do you understand that? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes. MERRITT: Alright. Ah, do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? [THE APPELLANT]: Yes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Darryl P.