Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 403 So. 2d 1227 - State v. Jeffcoat

403 So. 2d 1227 - State v. Jeffcoat’s Empirical Analysis

1981

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
2
states following
November 2001
most recently cited

12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently November 2001

12 state decisions

90198119902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Aguilar v. Texas · Spinelli v. United States · Jones v. United States · 290 So. 2d 681 - State v. Paciera · 392 So. 2d 381 - State v. Cann

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"The facts necessary to show probable cause may be established by hearsay evidence. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 [ 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 ] (1960); State v. Paciera, 290 So.2d 681 (La.1974). The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [ 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ] (1964), laid down the test by which information given the affiant by an unidentified informant could be considered by the magistrate in determining if there was probable cause upon which a search warrant should issue. `[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were there where he claimed they were and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed ... was "credible" or his information "reliable".' 378 U.S. at 114-115 [ 84 S.Ct. at 1513-14 ]. "A careful analysis of Aguilar reveals that its two-part test is designed to perform different functions. The first part is designed to insure that the informant obtained his information by personal observation, or in some other dependable manner rather than through mere rumor. This `basis of knowledge' test is a corollary of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the magistrate, and not the police officer-affiant or his informant, shall weigh the facts and decide whether they establish probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. [410] at 424 [ 89 S.Ct. 584, at 593 , 21 L.Ed.2”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “The facts necessary to show probable cause may be established by hearsay evidence. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); State v. Paciera, 290 So.2d 681 (La.1974). The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), laid down the test by which information given the affiant by an unidentified informant could be considered by the magistrate in determining if there was probable cause upon which a search warrant should issue. “[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were there where he claimed they were and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed ... was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 378 U.S. at 114-115 , 84 S.Ct. at 1514 , 12 L.Ed.2d at 729 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.