American National Insurance v. Motta’s Empirical Analysis
404 F.2d 167 · 1968
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently July 2003 · most notably 45 Ala. App. 607 - COTTON STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Knowles (1970), LaTorre v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance (1994)
15 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on James Sackley Company v. United States · Schwartz v. Northern Life Ins. · 89 So. 2d 329 - Praetorians v. Fisher · Crowley v. Travelers Ins.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Under the provisions of K.S.A. 40-451 and K.S.A. 40-2112, the coverage applied for was ‘in effect’ with the completion of the application and receipt of the initial premium. The coverage remained in effect, although it was limited, per the interim insurance receipt and K.S.A. 40-45I(b)(1) & (3), pending the underwriting decision. None of the limitations described in K.S.A. 40-451(b) or in the interim receipt in this case, suspend the running of tire two-year period in the policy when payment in case of suicide is restricted. With the counter-offer of coverage for an increased premium, full coverage was in effect under the terms of the policy for which the application was made. K.S.A. 40-2,112(d)(1)(B). When the counteroffer was accepted, the policy’s full terms remained in effect. “To argue that tire policy was not in effect for purposes of the suicide clause until the counter-offer was accepted and the additional premium was received, is contrary not only to the above-cited provisions, but also to the provisions of K.S.A. 40-420(2) which require that a policy be incontestable after it has been ‘in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of not more than two years from its date.’ Under the Kansas statutes, the policy was ‘in force,’ if temporarily limited, on December 6, 1993. Extending the period of the suicide clause to the date of issue listed on the policy when it was delivered — or 23 days after the interim insurance receipt date — would in effect abrogate”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“This receipt shall be binding from such effective date [April 20, 1964] until the date on which the policy applied for becomes effective or until the effective date of short-term coverage, if any, whichever is earlier; it is subject to the terms of said policy, must bear the same date and serial number as the application, and be signed by a duly authorized representative of the Company.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“would have the effect of establishing two insurance contracts. The first contract would not contain a suicide provision; the second contact would. Since neither party intended this two-contract arrangement,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.