Singh v. Gonzales’s Empirical Analysis
404 F.3d 1024 · 2005
Citation profile
15 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently August 2020 · most notably Iglesias v. Mukasey (2008), Kucana v. Mukasey (2008)
15 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1229A (§ 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (§ 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · VELARDE · Infanzon v. Ashcroft · Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Before 1996, the authority for motions to reopen derived solely from the regulations. Congress codified the motion to reopen process in 1996 in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6), a provision within the sub-chapter referred to in [§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)]. However, the statutory language only describes the contents of motions to reopen and the filing deadlines. Conspicuously absent is any specific language entrusting the decision on a motion to reopen to “the discretion of the Attorney General.” Moreover, a subsection of § 1252, the section that also contains the jurisdiction-stripping provision, provides that when a petitioner appeals a motion to reopen or reconsider an order, that appeal should be consolidated with the appeal of the underlying order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(6). That provision would be unnecessary if § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprived us of jurisdiction in the first place. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 , 397, 115 S.Ct. 1537 , 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (noting that courts must construe statutes to give effect, if possible, to every provision).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Kucana v. Mukasey“no court shall have jurisdiction to review any decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title. 1”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Patel v. Holder“was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis, such as invidious discrimination against a race or particular group.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Mungongo v. Gonzales
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.