Hudson v. Tyson

¶1dissenting.

¶2I respectfully dissent because this case should be dismissed on procedural grounds.1 In my dissent when this case was previously before us, Hudson v. Tyson (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 66, I concluded that this appeal was not timely because it should be treated as an appeal from an interlocutory order, and the record was not filed within the 30 day time limit required by Indiana Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 3(B).

¶3My reasons for this conclusion are more fully set out in my prior dissent, the essence of which is that proceedings supplemental are a continuation of the original cause of action, Citizens National Bank of Grant County v. Harvey (1976), 167 Ind.App. 582, 339 N.E.2d 604; Linton v. Linton (1975), 166 Ind.App. 409, 336 N.E.2d 687, 339 N.E.2d 96; Myers v. Hoover (1973), 157 Ind.App. 310, 300 N.E.2d 110, and an appeal therefrom is interlocutory in nature and is not an appeal from a final judgment. Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 406. Thus, we have no jurisdiction and this appeal should be dismissed.