Carson v. Com.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Court reasoned [in Harris ] that “law-abiding citizens, on a daily basis, also use film canisters to store film, which is a legitimate use.” [ 241 Va. at 154 , 400 S.E.2d at 196 .] In contrast, the item seized in this case is a one and one-half to two inch straw. The uniqueness of the straw’s size distinguishes it from straws one would usually encounter for legitimate purposes. See [Texas v.] Brown, 460 U.S. at 746 , 103 S.Ct. at 1545 (concurring opinion). Although possible, it is highly unlikely that a straw this size would have a legitimate use. Even assuming a legitimate use exists for a straw this size, probable cause to believe the straw is evidence of a crime may nonetheless be established. Even the uninflated, tied-off balloon [seized by a police officer under the plain view doctrine] in Texas v. Brown may have been simply a remnant of a birthday party and not an item used for carrying narcotics. However, an investigating officer does not have to “deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities,” and is permitted to make “common-sense conclusions about human behavior” in assessing a situation. Id. at 742 [ 103 S.Ct. at 1543 ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 17 Va. App. 313 - Arnold v. Commonwealth · 48 Va. App. 314 - Grandison v. Commonwealth

2. “That vehicles are required to stop at the toll booths in order to pay and in observance of the traffic control signs was intrinsic to the scheme of allowing the law enforcement officers, who were on foot, to intercept moving vehicles. "It is clear, in other words, that a Fourth Amendment seizure ... occur[s] ... when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower, [v. County of Inyo ], 489 U.S. [593] at 596-97 [ 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381 , 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989)]. Further, it is irrelevant that the automobile physically stopped at a statutorily mandated point, thus allowing the uniformed officer to step toward the oncoming automobile, to approach the driver before he drove off, and to "casually" ask the occupants their points of origin and destination. The test whether "a person has been `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment [remains] if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." [ United States v. ] Mendenhall, 446 U.S. [544] at 554 [ 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)]. Few, if any, of the thousands of people entering a toll booth on a major interstate thoroughfare would feel free to ignore the officer's advances and drive away. Thus, although a driver may be required to stop at a fixed traffic signal, a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave after paying the fare because of the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Carson v. Commonwealth

3. “An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.... [P]eople are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Carson v. Commonwealth