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404 So. 2d 804

Docket No. 81-599.

White v. State

Gerald Lamar WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided October 7, 1981.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1981-10-07

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“It is well settled that defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent since jurisdiction is established solely by general law.”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Evans v. State, 487 So. 2d 1130 - Wilson v. State

Relies on Dennis v. California · 225 So. 2d 548 - State v. Evans · 323 So. 2d 675 - Sclafani v. County of Dade

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-10-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently May 2002

12 state decisions

60198119902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*805 Bob M. Johnson, Tampa, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael A. Palecki, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

¶3BOARDMAN, Judge.

¶4Gerald Lamar White appeals the revocation of his probation. We reverse.

¶5Appellant was originally charged by information with three counts of trafficking in stolen property. He pled guilty and was given consecutive sentences of six months on each count on June 4, 1979. On July 24, 1979, he filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, which was denied.

¶6On February 26, 1980, appellant filed a motion to reconsider the prior motion for reduction of sentence. This motion was granted on March 10, 1980; the balance of appellant's jail sentence was suspended, and he was given concurrent five-year probationary terms.

¶7On March 13, 1981, an affidavit of probation violation and warrant were filed charging appellant with having committed several felonies. After hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's probation and gave him concurrent sentences of fifteen years on each count, despite appellant's counsel's contention at the revocation hearing that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it had not had jurisdiction to modify appellant's sentence when it did so. This appeal followed timely.

¶8Since the original sentence imposed was a legal sentence, the trial court was without jurisdiction to reduce the sentence at the time the second motion was filed. The sixty-day period following the original sentence had expired on August 3, 1979. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800; State v. Sutton, 371 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Mancil, 354 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).

¶9At the revocation hearing, the state contended that appellant consented to the trial court's maintaining jurisdiction in this matter and that therefore he is now estopped from raising that issue. However, it is well settled that a defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent since jurisdiction is established solely by general law. Art. V, § 6(b), Fla. Const.; Worley v. State, 396 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Sclafani v. County of Dade, 323 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); State v. Evans, 225 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1053, 90 S.Ct. 1394, 25 L.Ed.2d 668 (1970).

¶10Accordingly, the order purporting to place appellant on probation, the order revoking that probation, and the new judgment and sentence are REVERSED and the cause REMANDED with directions to reinstate appellant's original judgment and sentence.[1]

¶11SCHEB, C.J., and OTT, J., concur.

NOTES

¶12[1] Of course, for administrative purposes, appellant's record should be credited with all the time he has served under either sentence for the felonies involved here.

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