Snodgrass v. Baize’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 22 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently December 2017 · most notably Wood v. Mid-Valley Inc. (1991), Howell v. Richardson (1989)
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 22 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 64 Ill. 2d 187 - Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers · Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance · Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. v. Hammer · 22 Ill. App. 3d 883 - Cowan v. Insurance Co. of North America · Miller v. Alvey
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"In the instant case, the interests of the insured and the insurer were in partial conflict. The insured would benefit, to the extent of policy limits, from a finding of negligence which arguably was within the coverage of the policy. The insurer would favor a finding of an intentional tort which the policy did not cover. See Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hammer, [(4th Cir.1949) 177 F.2d 793 ]. In such a situation the insurer should not defend, but, rather, as here, should reimburse the insured's personal counsel. All-Star Insurance Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc. (N.D.Ind.1971) 324 F.Supp. 160, 165 . Because there was a partial conflict of interest and because [the insurer] could not rightfully have controlled [the insured's] defense, the rationale underlying the application of collateral estoppel does not apply.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"The underlying purpose of the doctrine [of collateral estoppel] is to obviate the delay and expense of two trials upon the same issue-one by the injured party against the indemni-tee and the other by the indemnitee, or the injured party against the indemnitor. This is possible because it is assumed that the interests of the parties to the contract of indemnity in opposing the injured person's claim are identical; and it is accomplished by giving the indemnitor an opportunity to appear in the first suit on behalf of the indemnitee so that everything that can be offered in exculpation of the indemnitee by either party to the indemnity contract may be presented."”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“'acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.