405 So. 2d 1328 - Robinson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Following the reasoning of Burks , supra, and Barham , supra, we hold that there was no double jeopardy impediment to appellant's retrial on the basis of the prosecution's alleged knowing use of perjured testimony at the first trial. Appellant received the relief to which he was entitled for error at his first trial — a new trial.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tomlin v. State · State v. Moore

2. “"Appellant cites United States v. Dinitz , 424 U.S. 600 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), and United States v. Jorn , 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (197[1]), in support of his contention that reprosecution should have been precluded by the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. He contends that the State's failure to turn over self-defense material prior to trial and its `knowing use of perjured testimony' at trial constituted prosecutorial bad faith which should have barred his retrial. "In Dinitz and Jorn , the United States Supreme Court alluded to the general rule that a defendant who moves for a mistrial cannot claim double jeopardy when his motion is granted and he obtains a new trial. By his motion for mistrial, he is deemed to have consented to end the first trial and obtain another one. "The court indicated, however, that if a defendant is forced to move for a mistrial because of `prosecutorial overreaching,' Dinitz , supra at 608 , 96 S.Ct. at 1079 , or `bad faith conduct by judge or prosecutor,' Jorn , supra at 485 , 91 S.Ct. at 557 , then he is not deemed to have elected to terminate his first trial and to obtain a new one. Instead, his motion is treated as a motion for mistrial by the prosecution and a retrial would constitute double jeopardy. Neither Dinitz nor Jorn , however, is applicable here since we are confronted not with a motion for mistrial, but with a motion for new trial. We therefore find the analysis of the mistria”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moore

3. “"It is our judgment, therefore, that the trial court acted to exclude evidence which appeared to be remote. The exclusion of remote evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge, Hembree v. City of Birmingham , Ala.Cr.App., 381 So.2d 664 (1980), and his decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of gross abuse. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence , § 21.01 (2) (3d ed. 1977)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 424 So. 2d 1374 - Word v. State