Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

405 So. 2d 500

Docket No. 81-436.

Reid v. State

Steven Michael REID, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided November 6, 1981.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1981-11-06

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“throw, place, or discharge any destructive device with intent to do bodily harm,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Spellman v. State

Relies on 333 So. 2d 457 - Alsdorf v. Broward County · A. J. House & Sons, Inc. v. Smith

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-11-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently April 2005

7 state decisions

50198119902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James S. Purdy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

¶3GRIMES, Judge.

¶4This case involves the construction of section 790.162, Florida Statutes (1979).

¶5Appellant entered a bank and handed a customer service employee a note which said, "I have a grenade. Don't press a button; first cop I see, I will toss it in your lap. I want to see you put $3,000 in one stack on the counter." The bank employee handed the note to a coworker who alerted a security guard. The security guard called the police, and they arrested appellant before he left the bank. Throughout this event, no one ever saw a bomb or grenade, and appellant had none in his possession when the police frisked him.

¶6The state charged appellant with threatening to throw, place or discharge a destructive device and with attempted robbery. At the trial, the state attorney conceded that appellant had not possessed a destructive device. The jury found appellant guilty of both charges, and he received consecutive sentences for the crimes. He appeals only his conviction for threatening to throw a destructive device.

¶7Section 790.162 reads:

790.162 Threat to throw, place or discharge any destructive device, felony; penalty. It is unlawful for any person to threaten to throw, place, or discharge any destructive device with intent to do bodily harm to any person or with intent to do damage to any property of any person, and any person convicted thereof shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

¶8Appellant contends that since there was no evidence that he had any intent to do bodily harm or damage to property, the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. A literal reading of the statute lends some credence to appellant's position, but as so interpreted, it would not make much sense. Accordingly, we reject this interpretation since courts will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to create *501 an absurd result. Thomas v. State,317 So.2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied,333 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1976).

¶9Section 790.161 provides that it is unlawful for any person to throw, place or discharge a destructive device with intent to do bodily harm or damage to property. Section 790.162, which essentially tracks the same language, was obviously intended to cover a threat to carry out the conduct proscribed by section 790.161. Viewed in this context, we think that section 790.162 requires only that the threat must convey an intent to do bodily harm or damage to property. Here, appellant's threat obviously conveyed this intent. Therefore, under our construction of the statute, whether appellant intended to follow through with his threat was irrelevant.

¶10AFFIRMED.

¶11HOBSON, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.

/405/so2d/500 · .json · Public domain