United States v. Dooling’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

81 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 116 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, when no appeal is authorized by law or court rule, but mandamus can be used to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice. This principle of law is sound and is due to be followed, but equally sound is the principle that mandamus can be used by the government in aid of its lawful rights in the prosecution of criminal cases. In United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.1969), the Court, in granting mandamus, opined: "`We will not pause to determine whether, if Judge Dooling entered his proposed order, the government would be able to appeal his determination under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964). Even if it were clear that the government could not appeal the government's argument for mandamus would not be made more compelling, for mandamus may not do service for an appeal which has been barred by the Constitution. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97 , 88 S.Ct. 269 , 19 L.Ed.2d 305 ... (1967). We think it equally true that the fact that the government may have no right of appeal does not act as a conclusive bar to the issuance of mandamus in its favor. Certainly the restrictions placed upon the government's right to appeal do reflect important policy judgments by Congress, at their core protecting the right against double jeopardy, which must not be undermined by casual resort to mandamus. But circumstances can arise which present a compelling need for the issuance of mandamus in order to further impo”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. DiStefano · Ex Parte Sullivan

2. “(I)f there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States of America Ex Rel. Kahmid Solomon, Relator-Appellant v. Vincent R. Mancusi, Warden of Attica Prison · Hilbert v. Dooling

3. “* * * And, of course, upon appeals from convictions this court will review the propriety of Judge Weinstein's original ruling, Judge Dooling's ruling that events at the trial did not demonstrate that defendants had been seriously prejudiced by the delays before trial, and any other rulings which denied properly preserved objections to the conduct of the trial itself. The existence of these avenues of redress for the defendants eliminates any need for the existence of a power in the trial court to dismiss an indictment, after the return of guilty verdicts, on grounds rejected before trial. The exercise of such a power by a district judge would interfere seriously with the proper prosecution of criminal cases in the federal courts. 26 ****** 27 * * * 28 "* * * Since we believe that the dismissal of an indictment after a verdict of guilty, upon grounds examined and found deficient before trial, is highly deleterious to the sound administration of criminal justice, it is important that we make a clear and unequivocal response to the first example of such a dismissal to come before us. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Whitted