Turner v. Kight’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 29 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2022 · most notably Artis v. District of Columbia (2018), Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc. (2012)
4 federal appellate · 29 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs · Connecticut National Bank v. Germain · American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah · Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger · Burnett v. New York Central Railroad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) ... shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of SO days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The rules governing the construction of Federal statutes are well-established. The preeminent canon requires the court to “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176, 183 , 124 S.Ct. 1587, 1593 , 158 L.Ed.2d 338, 345 (2004), quoting from Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 [253-54], 112 S.Ct. 1146 [1149], 117 L.Ed.2d 391 [397 (1992)]. If “the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that would be the end of our analysis.” Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 , 127 S.Ct. 1534, 1543 , 167 L.Ed.2d 449, 461 (2007); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Equalization, [552] U.S. [9], [20], 128 S.Ct. 467, 474 , 169 L.Ed.2d 418, 429 (2007). On the other hand, the interpretation of a word or phrase as used in a statute is not always governed by a dictionary definition of the word in isolation, but “depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 , 126 S.Ct. 1252, 1257 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1079, 1087-88 (2006). Extrinsic materials, such as legislative history, “have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” Exxon Mobil Co”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“This interpretation treats that period in the statute — the federal claim period plus thirty days — as a single span of time. If the state limitations period runs out during that span, the thirtieth day after dismissal becomes the new filing deadline. Under these circumstances, the outcome is the same as under the ‘annul and replace’ interpretations. If, however, the state limitations period does not run out diming that span of time, the state limitations period is unaffected and terminates without regard to any federal court filings.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.