407 So. 2d 1005 - Mitchell v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(2) A defendant shall not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry into accused's comprehension of that offer and his capacity to make that choice intelligently and understandingly has been made. (3) No waiver shall be accepted where it appears that the defendant is unable to make an intelligent and understanding choice because of his mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mansfield v. State · Smith v. State

2. “In the instant case the trial judge failed to comply with either the Florida rule or the Faretta standard. There was no inquiry into Mitchell's capacity to intelligently and understandingly make the choice. Cf. Williams v. State, 337 So.2d 846 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). More specifically, there was no inquiry of record as to Mitchell's mental condition, age, education or experience. While the record strongly suggests that nothing the trial court could have done, short of discharge of the defendant, would have satisfied Mitchell, the indicated requirements were not met. We can understand, and perhaps even concur in, the trial court's finding that the conduct of the defendant Mitchell constituted a rejection of court-appointed counsel. But without the inquiry required in Rule 3.111(d) or the appearance of private counsel, the public defender (whether Cacavio, Thurman or Pierce) should not have been discharged, even though that defender's ensuing task might have been unpleasant. Mitchell had no right to pick and choose an appointed attorney, and the trouble in this case was that this fact was never fully impressed on him. It was an all or nothing proposition — the office of the public defender or no one. If no one, then the rule sets forth the requisite procedure.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 415 So. 2d 874 - Drago v. State

3. “[I]n order to represent himself, the accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forego those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, at 464-465 , 58 S.Ct. [1019], at 1023 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461 ]. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323 , 92 L.Ed. 309 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, at 279 , 63 S.Ct. [236], at 242 [ 87 L.Ed. 268 ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State