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← 408 F.3d 321 - Wisehart v. Davis

Wisehart v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

408 F.3d 321 · 2005

Citation profile

55
cited by 55 later decisions
4
states following
April 2025
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently April 2025 · most notably Joseph v. Coyle (2006), 371 Ill. App. 3d 382 - People v. Ward (2007)

24 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

320200520102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · Miller-El v. Cockrell Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division · Giglio v. United States · Napue v. People of the State of Illinois · Grupo Mexicano Desarrollos v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The first and most common [way to impeach a witness based on benefits given to the witness by the prosecution] is by showing that the benefits were given in- return for the witness’s providing testimony that would help the prosecution. He might have told the prosecutor what he would testify to if called and the prosecutor might have explicitly agreed to give him specified benefits if he testified consistently with his proffer.... Or there might have been a tacit understanding that if his testimony was helpful to the prosecution, the state would give him a break on some pending criminal charge.... Express or tacit, either way there would be an agreement, it would be usable for impeachment, and it would have to be disclosed to the defense.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “existed; the commonplace nature of plea bargaining — and the leniency inherent in and necessary to the bargaining process — would require intense scrutiny of all witnesses and would imply agreement in nearly all similar cases. Id. Second, the court noted the minimal impeachment value of such leniency once charging practices were explained to the jury. Id. The fact that Johnson expected to benefit by his testimony was immaterial:”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““In short *** the extraneous communication to the juror must be of a character that creates a reasonable suspicion that further inquiry is necessary to determine whether the defendant was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. How much inquiry is necessary (perhaps very little, or even none) depends on how likely was the extraneous communication to contaminate the jury’s deliberations.” Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d at 326 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.