408 Pa. Super. 188 - Commonwealth v. Bagley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

47 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is well settled that if a person voluntarily consents to a search, evidence found as a result of that search is admissible against him. See: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). See also: Commonwealth v. Latshaw, 481 Pa. 298, 303 , 392 A.2d 1301, 1304 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 , 99 S.Ct. 2050 , 60 L.Ed.2d 659 (1979); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 286 , 314 A.2d 317, 318 (1974); Commonwealth v. Walsh, 314 Pa.Super. 65, 73 , 460 A.2d 767, 771 (1983). The consent, however, must be "given freely, specifically, unequivocally, and voluntarily." Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249 , 255, 297 A.2d 471, 475 (1972). See also: Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 221 , 239 A.2d 290, 293 (1968); Commonwealth v. Lowery, 305 Pa.Super. 66, 74 , 451 A.2d 245, 248-249 (1982). "[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact `voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. at 2047-2048 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 862-863 . See also: Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 274-275 , 372 A.2d 687, 693-694 (1977); Commonwealth v. Smagala, 383 Pa.Super. 466, 474 , 557 A.2d 347, 350 (1989); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 376 Pa.Super. 536, 553 , 546 A.2d 654, 662 (1988). The burden of proving a valid consent to search rests upon the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 232 Pa.Supe”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 438 Pa. Super. 131 - Commonwealth v. Washington · 438 Pa. Super. 131 - Com. v. Washington

2. ““The language of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a warrant describes the items to be seized ‘as nearly as may be. . . .’ The clear meaning of the language is that a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible. This requirement is more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment, which merely requires particularity in the description. The Pennsylvania Constitution further requires the description to be as particular as is reasonably possible.” Bagley, supra at 196 , 596 A.2d at 814 . “A search warrant serves to authorize the seizure of identifiable and existing property. ” Id. at 197, 596 A.2d at 815 . (emphasis added) Thus, the use of a search warrant as a general investigatory tool is prohibited by both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Seized Property of Bartholomew · 411 Pa. Super. 628 - Commonwealth v. Friedman

3. “It is a fundamental rule of law that a warrant must name or describe with particularity the property to be seized and the person or place to be searched.... The particularity requirement prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad. These are two separate, though related, issues. A warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize. This will result in the general “rummaging” banned by the fourth amendment. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 , 48 S.Ct. 74, 75 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). A warrant unconstitutional for its overbreadth authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of items, or documents, many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under investigation... An overbroad warrant is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search and seizure. The language of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a warrant describe the items to be seized “as nearly as may be.... ” The clear meaning of the language is that a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible. This requirement is more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment, which merely requires particularity in the description. The Pennsylvania Constitution further requires the description to be as particular as is reasonably possible.... Consequently”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2003 Pa. Super. 29 - Commonwealth v. Rivera