408 Pa. Super. 502 - Rosenberg v. Nicholson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]t is not necessary [that] the plaintiffs conduct be such that it constitutes some bad faith act or overt attempt to delay before the rule of Lamp will apply, [citation omitted] Simple neglect and mistake to fulfill the responsibility to see that requirements for service are carried out may be sufficient to bring the rule in Lamp to bear, [citation omitted] Thus, conduct that is unintentional that works to delay the defendant’s notice of the action may constitute a lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2004 Pa. Super. 460 - Devine v. Hutt · 2007 Pa. Super. 233 - Englert v. Fazio Mechanical Services, Inc.

2. ““On January 4, 1988, the plaintiff filed a praecipe for the issuance of a writ of summons with the prothonotary of Dauphin County. Payment for the issuance of the writ was made, but on the back of the writ was written: ‘writ to atty. 1/4/87 RB.’ [The 1987 date was an error and the writ was actually given to the attorney in 1988.] Next in the record is a certificate of service, prepared by an employee for the plaintiff’s attorney, indicating that a copy of the writ was served upon the defendants by first class mail dated January 5, 1988. This was not disputed by the defendants. “Also, on January 5,1988, the defendants were served with a notice to appear for deposition on February 2, 1988. Counsel for the defendants, on or about March 3, 1988, objected to the deposition ‘referencing the writ of summons, at which point it was agreed to postpone said deposition indefinitely.’ . . . “Nonetheless, from March 15 through April 4,1988, documentation (which included the plaintiff’s medical bills) was submitted to the defendants’ insurer ‘with regard to a possible settlement of the claim on a “policy limits” basis.’ ... “It was not until after April 4, 1988, that the plaintiff learned that settlement would not occur. Rather, the case was being contested ‘on technical grounds involving alleged deficiencies in the service of the writ of summons.’ . . . “After the passage of the two-year period of limitations, the plaintiff filed a praecipe on May 17, 1988, seeking the reissuance of the wr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 34 Pa. D. & C.4th 42 - Maroney v. T.J. Lipton Co.

3. “[W]e rule that henceforth, i.e., in actions instituted subsequent to the date of this decision, a writ of summons shall remain effective to commence an action only if the plaintiff then refrains from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks the legal machinery he has just set in motion---- [A] plaintiff should comply with local practice as to the delivery of the writ to the sheriff for service. If under local practice it is the prothonotary who both prepares the writ and delivers it to the sheriff, the plaintiff shall have done all that is required of him when he files the praecipe for the writ; the commencement of the action shall not be affected by the failure of the writ to reach the sheriff’s office where the plaintiff is not responsible for that failure. Otherwise, the plaintiff shall be responsible for prompt delivery of the writ to the sheriff for service.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 431 Pa. Super. 58 - Green v. Vinglas