Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

408 So. 2d 766

Docket No. 81-111.

Carter v. State

Thomas Allan CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided January 13, 1982.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1982-01-13

Relies on Faretta v. California · Evans v. State · 222 So. 2d 38 - MacHwart v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-01-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently August 2007

5 state decisions

30198219902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas R. Mott, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

¶3COWART, Judge.

¶4The record discloses an adequate basis for the trial court to have concluded that the appellant voluntarily, knowingly, understandingly and intelligently[1] waived his right to have counsel to represent him *767 at trial. The trial judge satisfied himself that appellant had enough information to make an informed decision and was competent enough to know he was making such a decision. The trial judge is not required to inquire as to an accused's technical legal knowledge and ability or to satisfy himself that the accused is making a wise decision in exercising his right to waive counsel and to defend himself. However, the trial judge was caught in another snare. An accused is entitled to have counsel at every critical stage of a criminal prosecution. Sentencing is such a critical stage.[2] Due process requires that a defendant have counsel at sentencing or that the record show his solvency or valid waiver at that time. The record on appeal, as supplemented, shows that at the sentencing proceeding in this case the trial judge, recalling that appellant had waived counsel for, and represented himself at, trial, merely confirmed his recollection by asking appellant if he had represented himself and, upon receiving an affirmative reply, proceeded with the sentencing. Accordingly the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the sentence is vacated and the cause remanded for inquiry as to appellant's desire for counsel to represent him at sentencing and for resentencing.

¶5JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, CAUSE REMANDED.

¶6COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶7[1] See Faretta v. California,422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.160(e).

¶8[2] Machwart v. State,222 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Wingard v. State,200 So.2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Fulmore v. State,198 So.2d 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Langlois v. State,191 So.2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Reader v. State,168 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Williams v. State,165 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Evans v. State,163 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).

/408/so2d/766 · .json · Public domain