Robert Lee Gawne v. United States of America, William Thomas Banks v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

62 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As originally enacted, the Federal Kidnaping Act applied only if the kidnaped person was "held for ransom or reward.” Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 , quoted in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 , 125, 56 S.Ct. 395 , 395-96, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936). In 1934 the statute was amended to extend its coverage to interstate transportation of kidnaped persons "held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, hy a parent thereof * * (Emphasis added). The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of this amendment was to extend the statute's reach "to persons who have been kidnaped and held, not only for reward, but for any other reason." S.Rep. No. 534, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (emphasis added).... In Gooch v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court held that in light of the language and legislative history of the 1934 amendment a purpose to obtain pecuniary benefit was no longer required. In United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 , 84 S.Ct. 553 , 11 L.Ed.2d 527 (1964), the Court held that an illegal purpose need not be shown. In light of these cases, the statutory language, and the committee reports, several Courts of Appeals have recognized that the kidnaper's motivation is not an element of the offense. United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 , 766 (4th Cir.1964); Hayes v. United States, 296 F.2d 657 , 665-667 (8th Cir.1961); Clinton v. United States, 260 F.2d 824 , 825 (5th Cir.1958); Brooks v. United States, 199 F.2d 336 (4t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Sriyuth

2. “"There is nothing in the legislative history to contradict the unqualified assertions of the committee reports that the language [‘or otherwise’] was intended to mean ‘any other reason.’ . This does not mean that the phrase ‘held for ransom or reward or otherwise,’ is surplusage. The word to be emphasized is ‘held,’ for ‘involuntariness of seizure and detention * * * is the very essence of the crime of kidnaping.’ Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 , 464, 66 S.Ct. 233 , 237, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946). Thus the true elements of the offense are an unlawful seizure and holding, followed by interstate transportation.” 409 F.2d at 1403 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Atchison

3. “knowingly transporting (their victim) in interstate commerce 'for the purpose of forcing the (victim) to assist them in their unlawful flight . . . to avoid prosecution for grand larceny.' " The government sought to prove the recited purpose, and the court instructed the jury that it was an element of the offense, to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that "(s)ince appellants' purpose was not an element of the offense, this allegation of the indictment was surplusage and need not have been proved. The question is whether introduction of this issue into the case affected appellants' substantial rights.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Shield