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409 F.2d 836

Docket No. 16973.

United States v. Anderson

Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 18, 1969.

Decided April 14, 1969.

Third Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1969-04-14

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently November 1972

9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1702 · 18 U.S.C. § 1708

Relies on Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. · Prado Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission · National Labor Relations Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1969-04-14

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¶1Peter J. Webby, Wilkes-Barre, Pa., for appellant.

¶2Harry A. Nagle, Bernard J. Brown, U. S. Attorney, Lewisburg, Pa., for appellee.

¶3OPINION OF THE COURT

¶4Before VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6Defendant has appealed from a Judgment and Commitment of August 3, 1967, sentencing him to three years concurrently, pursuant to findings that defendant was guilty of each of the three counts of the Information1 after a trial to the court.

¶7*837After careful consideration of the record, we have concluded that there was ample evidence to support the guilty findings of the able trial judge.2 There is no indication whatever (1) that the trial judge did not properly evaluate the testimony of Walter Herman, who had committed a felony, after scrutinizing it with care in accordance with the standard specified in United States v. Barrasso, 267 F.2d 908, 910 (3rd Cir. 1959), and (2) that he did not properly'consider the testimony of the juvenile accomplice, J. H. Herman,3 after close, careful and rigid scrutiny as required by United States v. Schanerman, 150 F.2d 941, 943 (3rd Cir. 1945). The testimony of the 16-year old boy accomplice that defendant had been drinking wine but was not drunk, stuttering or staggering (N.T. 34-36) did not require the fact finder to conclude that a reasonable doubt had been raised in his mind on the existence of the requisite intent when the defendant performed the acts charged in the information.4 See Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 257, 27 S.Ct. 600, 51 L.Ed. 1047 (1907); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31, 65 S.Ct. 918, 89 L.Ed. 1441 (1945); Doub v. United States, 341 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 382 U.S. 851, 86 S.Ct. 98, 15 L.Ed.2d 89 (1965).

¶8The concurrent sentences imposed were substantially less than those authorized by Congress in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1702 and 1708, as amended July 1, 1952, and it is noted that the District Court sentence provided that defendant may become eligible for parole at such time as the Board of Parole may determine under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (2).

¶9The above-mentioned Judgment and Commitment will be affirmed.

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