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← 409 F.2d 888 - United States v. Bennett

United States v. Bennett’s Empirical Analysis

409 F.2d 888 · 1969

Citation profile

296
cited by 296 later decisions
4
cited 4 times by the Supreme Court
26
states following
April 2020
most recently cited

202 federal appellate · 7 district · 50 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 296 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2020 · most notably Fisher v. United States (1976), Andresen v. Maryland (1976)

202 federal appellate · 7 district · 50 state decisions — followed in 26 states

21801969197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Katz v. United States · Johnson v. Zerbst · Gideon v. Wainwright · United States v. Wade

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 296 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]o require that defense counsel be allowed or appointed to attend out-of-court proceedings where the defendant himself is not present would press the Sixth Amendment beyond any previous boundary. None of the classical analyses of the assistance to be given by counsel . . . suggests that counsel must be present when the prosecution is interrogating witnesses in the defendant's absence even when, as here, the defendant is under arrest; counsel is rather to be provided to prevent the defendant himself from falling into traps devised by a lawyer on the other side and to see to it that all available defenses are proffered. Many other aspects of the prosecution's interviews with a victim or a witness to a crime afford just as much opportunity for undue suggestion as the display of photographs . . . .”
    15 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The reason why we shrink from allowing a personal diary to be the object of a search is that the entire diary must be read to discover whether there are incriminating entries; most of us would feel rather differently with respect to a ‘diary’ whose cover page bore the title ‘Robberies I Have Performed’.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We find no distinction of constitutional dimensions between the seizure of Hayden’s clothing and of Egan’s letter. While the demise of the ‘mere evidence’ rule may well require the development of some new restriction on allowable search and seizure in its place, we suggest with deference that an approach geared to the objective of the Fourth Amendment to secure privacy would seem more promising than one based on the testimonial character of what is seized. . . . Despite Mr. Justice Bradley’s dicta in Boyd . . . now largely repudiated by Hayden , . . . the Fourth Amendment does not protect broadly against the seizure of things whose compulsory production would be forbidden by the Fifth. . . . [N]o one could have seriously asserted, even before Hayden , that the Fourth Amendment protected such papers against seizure pursuant to a search warrant or a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.