Brown v. Greiner’s Empirical Analysis
409 F.3d 523 · 2005
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 2 district · 6 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2101 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (§ 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on United States v. Booker · Apprendi v. New Jersey · Blakely v. Washington · Almendarez-Torres v. United States · Williams v. Taylor
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In [Terry ] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the court, stated: “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.” Id. at 390 , 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (Stevens, J., for the court) (emphasis added). In a separate opinion, Justice O’Connor, also writing for a majority of the court, stated that the phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” refers “to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412 , 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (O’Connor, J., for the court) (emphasis added).”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(a) A persistent felony offender is a person, other than a persistent violent felony offender as defined in section 70.08, who stands convicted of a felony after having previously been convicted of two or more felonies, as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subdivision. (b) A previous felony conviction within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this subdivision is a conviction of a felony in this state, or of a crime in any other jurisdiction, provided: (i) that a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, or a sentence to death, was imposed therefor; and (ii) that the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for such conviction prior to the commission of the present felony; and (iii) that the defendant was not pardoned on the ground of innocence; and (iv) that such conviction was for a felony offense other than persistent sexual abuse, as defined in section 130.53 of this chapter. (c) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more previous felony convictions, two or more convictions of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Later Supreme Court decisions play no role in assessing the reasonableness of the state court decisions (footnote omitted). Accordingly, our appraisal of reasonableness of the state court interpretations of Apprendi may not be influenced by the Supreme Court’s subsequent elucidation in such cases as Blakely v. Washington, [ 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004)] and United States v. Booker, [ 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005)]. We conclude that the state courts did not unreasonably apply Apprendi and the cases that preceded it, as understood at the time, and therefore, that Petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.