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← 409 F.3d 689 - Sample v. Bailey

Sample v. Bailey’s Empirical Analysis

409 F.3d 689 · 2005

Citation profile

125
cited by 125 later decisions
1
states following
May 2025
most recently cited

55 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 125 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit (2005), Chappell v. City of Cleveland (2009)

55 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

670200520102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1441 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton · Graham v. Connor · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Malley v. Briggs

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 125 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “First, we determine whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff! ] show that a constitutional violation has occurred. Second, we consider whether the violation involved a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Third, we determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.”
    18 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Having established that there was a constitutional violation, we turn to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis — whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established. “If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not ... fairly be said to ‘know1 that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.” Harlow [v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ]. The constitutional right cannot simply be a general prohibition, but rather “the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been clearly established in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The Court noted that “[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We have held that it has been clearly established in this circuit for the last twenty years that a criminal suspect “ha[s] a right not to be shot unless he [is] perceived to pose a threat to the pursuing officers or to others during flight.” Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir.1988). This articulation of the Gamer rule is clearly established even in situations with diverse factual distinctions ... Thus regardless of whether the incident took place at day or night, in a building or outside, whether the suspect is fleeing or found, armed or unarmed, intoxicated or sober, mentally unbalanced or sane, it is clearly established that a reasonable police officer may not shoot the suspect unless the suspect poses a perceived threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. These factual distinctions between cases do not alter the certainty about the law itself.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.