409 So. 2d 731 - Durant v. Hamrick’s Empirical Analysis
1981
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently April 2017
1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Killingsworth v. Killingsworth · Owens v. Owens · Nunn v. Keith · Bernhard v. Bernhard · Mitchell v. Frederick
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We hold that the 1968 and 1969 deeds in issue on this appeal did, as a matter of well established property law, create in the original grantees therein a form of concurrent ownership in property as tenants in common during the respective lives of the grantees with cross-contingent remainders in fee to the survivor. Accordingly, because such interests are indestructible by the act of one cotenant, the defendant, under the facts in this case, has no interest in the two parcels of real estate which are the subject of this appeal. Our decision in this case should not be construed as overruling Nunn v. Keith. On the contrary, Nunn dealt with a conveyance to “joint tenants,” not tenants in common. Nunn construed our statute relating to joint tenancy, not tenancy in common. The statute itself speaks in terms of joint tenants, not tenants in common. As to public policy considerations respecting “survivorship” provisions, it is clearly a legislative prerogative to enact an appropriate statute declaring any form of “survivorship” in property void whether in the form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common for life with cross-contingent remainders to the survivor in fee. In this case we simply recognize another form of concurrent ownership of property with provisions for survivorship — as tenants in common for life with cross-contingent remainders to the survivor in fee, indestructible as at common law.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The evil that was spoken of that was worse than § 19 was the exceptions that were argued for in the interest of justice. One exception had to be made in the case of married couples who could not agree on disposition of their property in the event of marital discord. Our court allowed the estate to be destroyed incident to a divorce proceeding. Owens v. Owens, 281 Ala. 239 , 201 So.2d 396 (Ala.1967). Other exceptions were either expressly or impliedly rejected. Summerlin v. Bowden, 286 Ala. 391 , 240 So.2d 356 (1970); Shrout v. Seale, 287 Ala. 215 , 250 So.2d 592 (1971). By this court’s decision today, we now have joint tenancies with right of survivorship that are destructible and tenancies in common with cross contingent remainders which are not destructible. Are the results any less evil now than they were when Nunn v. Keith was decided? Many scholars, judges and lawyers thought that this complex issue of destructibility of these estates had been decided once and for all in the Nunn case. A couple who purchased property sixteen years ago under a joint tenancy with right of survivorship or tenancy in common with right of survivorship has had four major decisions from this court affecting their interest in the property ac quired — Bernhard v. Bernhard [ 278 Ala. 240 , 177 So.2d 565 (1965)]; Nunn v. Keith; Jackson v. Fillmore, 367 So.2d 948 (Ala.1979); and this case. In none of the cases have we squarely held whether the decisions there were to be applied prospectively or retr”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“Nunn v. Keith was intended to be the final word in “one of the most confused areas of Alabama law.” The decision today unfortunately revives all of the “problems” inherent in instruments which use words of survivorship in grants or devises to two or more persons. Some of these questions are as follows: What estate did the parties intend to create — a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common with cross-contingent remainders? Are the estates destructible? Can one joint tenant or tenant in common force partition or sale on his co-owner? Can creditors reach the interest of a co-owner? Can one joint tenant or tenant in common transfer his interest, and what effect does that transfer have on the nature of the instrument or interest of the co-owner? Because I think Nunn v. Keith answered all of these questions, and settled the law in this area involving instruments which use words of survivorship in grants to two or more persons, and because I think the Court fails to follow the holding of Nunn v. Keith in this case, I must respectfully dissent.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.