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← 409 U.S. 41 - Murch v. Mottram

Murch v. Mottram’s Empirical Analysis

1972

Citation profile

178
cited by 178 later decisions
10
cited 10 times by the Supreme Court
10
states following
April 2014
most recently cited

53 federal appellate · 18 district · 36 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 178 later decisions (10 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2014 · most notably Wainwright v. Sykes (1977), Rose v. Lundy (1982)

53 federal appellate · 18 district · 36 state decisions — followed in 10 states

86019721980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedRobert H. Mottram v. Frank F. Murch (from First Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Fay v. Noia · Sanders v. United States · State v. Mottram · Craig v. Gilliard

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 178 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[tjhere can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. ... No prisoner has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “From the Court’s personal observation of petitioner, it is apparent that he is of at least average intelligence and well deserves his reputation as a cunning “jailhouse lawyer.” He was represented at the time by counsel of unquestioned competence and integrity. It is inconceivable that his counsel did not fully explain to petitioner the possible consequences of his action. The Court, therefore, finds that petitioner was fully aware of these consequences and that by deliberately bypassing the orderly procedures provided by the Maine post-conviction statute for raising the issues presented in his most recent state habeas petition and in his present petition in this. Court, petitioner has forfeited his right to do so. * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[I]f a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground. The same may be true if, as in Wong Doo , the prisoner deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing. Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.