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← 41 F.3d 917 - United States v. Washington

United States v. Washington’s Empirical Analysis

41 F.3d 917 · 1994

Citation profile

46
cited by 46 later decisions
2
states following
June 2025
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently June 2025 · most notably United States v. Layne (1999), United States v. Randall (1999)

16 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

2401994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 924 · 21 U.S.C. § 801 (§ 101 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 802 (§ 102 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 844 (§ 404 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Anders v. California · United States v. Swiderski · United States v. Ramirez · United States v. Wright · United States v. Speer

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The record clearly demonstrates that Washington was not involved in any way in the trafficking of drugs. He did not sell drugs, and he was not a courier of drugs. He simply bought cocaine, which he planned to use himself and to share with his friends. However, Washington's intent to share the cocaine with others is sufficient for a court to find that he possessed drugs with intent to distribute.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The precise issue raised by the appellants is whether a statutory “transfer” may occur between two individuals in joint possession of a controlled substance simultaneously acquired for their own use. In order to interpret the foregoing words of the Act it is important to understand their place in the statutory drug enforcement scheme as a whole, which draws a sharp distinction between drug offenses of a commercial nature and illicit personal use of controlled substances. For this reason the House Report equated “transactions involving others” and “distribution to others” with the harsher penalties provided by §§ 841 and 848. Where only individual possession and use is concerned, on the other hand, the Act prescribes lesser penalties and emphasizes rehabilitation of the drug abuser. Similarly, where two individuals simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together, their only crime is personal drug abuse — simple joint possession, unthout any intent to distribute the drug further. Since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person, neither serves as a link in the chain of distribution. For purposes of the Act they must therefore be treated as possessors for personal use rather than for further distribution. Their simple joint possession does not pose any of the evils which Congress sought to deter and punish through the more severe penalties provided for those e”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We agree ... that a defendant who purchases a drug and shares it with a friend has `distributed' the drug even though the purchase was part of a joint venture to use drugs.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.