41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 - Williams v. Pryor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, being a wholesaler, to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute, for the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at retail, any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. Material not otherwise obscene may be obscene under this section if the distribution of the material, the offer to do so, or the possession with the intent to do so is a commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal. Any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) and may also be imprisoned in the county jail or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than one year. A second or subsequent violation of this subdivision is a Class C felony if the second or subsequent violation occurs after a conviction has been obtained for a previous violation. Upon a second violation, a corporation or business entity shall be fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,-000). (3) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, or offer or agree to produce, any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary ”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 772 So. 2d 64 - State v. Brenan · 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 - Williams v. King

2. “Certain submissions to the court, and certain facts that were stipulated, establish that some level of popularity in the use of sexual devices has evolved over the past twenty years. For example, several publications and websites discuss or suggest the use of these devices in aid of achieving orgasm. The parties also have stipulated that these devices possess some therapeutic value (or at least that plaintiffs and certain experts in human sexuality believe they do). Evidence of recent popularity notwithstanding, the most persuasive evidence supporting an argument that use of these devices can satisfy the Gluclcsberg standards is the fact that the federal Food and Drug Administration promulgated regulations concerning some of the more common sexual devices, establishing standards for their therapeutic use. The FDA first established such regulations in 1980. See 45 Fed.Reg. 12684-12720 (1980); see also Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Whaley, 658 F.2d 1249 , 1254 n. 6 (8th Cir.1981). The twenty years of regulation proves to be the most persuasive evidence before the court, largely because it is the most longstanding. In fact, aside from references to two publications, it is the only stipulation or eviden-tiary submission dating from an earlier decade. The court also notes that neither of the vendor plaintiffs has operated her relevant business (at least in Alabama) for more than six years.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 - Williams v. King

3. “Section 1. The Legislature of Alabama finds and declares: (1) That in order to protect children from exposure to obscenity, prevent assaults on the sensibilities of unwilling adults by the purveyor[s] of obscene material, and suppress the proliferation of “adult-only video stores,” “adult bookstores,” “adult movie houses,” and “adult-only entertainment,” .the sale and dissemination of obscene material should be regulated without impinging on the First Amendment rights of free speech by erecting barriers to the open display of erotic and lascivious material. 1998 Ala. Acts 98-467. These findings and declarations clearly suggest that the purpose behind this act was to prohibit “open display[s]” of things “obscene,” specifically those displays accessible to “children” and “unwilling adults.” In addition, upon consideration of the pleadings, motions, briefs, oral arguments of counsel, and independent judicial research, the court .finds that the state’s interest in passing the Act also could have been: . (1) the belief that “[t]he commerce of sexual .stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake, unrelated to marriage, procreation or familial relationships is an evil, an obscenity ... detrimental to the health and morality of the state” (Brief of Alabama Attorney General, at 21); or (2) the desire to ban commerce in all “obscene” material.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 - Williams v. Pryor