Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

41 La. Ann. 596

State v. Frank

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Decided May 15, 1889

Supreme Court of Louisiana · decided 1889-05-15

<p>An indictment which charges an offender with breaking and entering a store-house, used as a dwelling-house, in which a person was, at the time residing, is equivalent to charging that the offender did break and enter a dwelling-house, a person being lawfully therein; and such indictment contains the essential elements of the crime of burglary, and is, therefore, valid and sufficient.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1946

3 state decisions

101889189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Watkins, J.

¶2The sole question presented by this appeal, arises on a motion in arrest of judgment filed in the court below, and an assignment of error filed here. They are to the effect that the indictment does not charge the accused with breaking and entering a house which was at the time lawfully occupied, and, therefore, no judgment and sentence could be pronounced thereon for “ breaking and entering a dwelling-house in the night time, with intent to kill.”

¶3The indictment charges that “ on or about the 1st of January, 1889, Eugene Frank, did unlawfully, feloniously, wilfully and burglariously, and with his malice aforethought, in tlie night time, break and enter a dwelling-house, that is to say, a store-house used as a dwelling-house im, which Adolphe Ohaehere was then residing, with intent to kill, being at the time, armed with a dangerous weapon, and … did then and there commit an assault upon the said Adolphe Chachére, etc.”

¶4It was evidently the intention of the grand jury to indict the accused under Section 85U of the Revised Statutes, and the district attorney so framed the bill. It is so stated in terms, in the judgment of the court below.

¶5It provides that “ whoever, with intent to kill * * shall in the night time break and enter … a dwelling-house, any person being lawfully therein, at the time of such breaking and entering, armed with a dangerous weapon … ® or committing an actual assault upon any person lawfully being in such house, etc.” R. S., Sec. 1850.

¶6Not only does the indictment respond, in substance, to the requirements of the statute, but it does not appear to be susceptible of any other interpretation.

¶7What idea does the phrase “ a store-house used as a dwelling-house, in which Adolphe Chachére was then residing,” mean 1 Certainly, that the store-house was, at the time, lawfully occupied by Adolphe Chachére as a dwelling-house.

¶8The indictment further charges that the accused was, at the tíme, armed with a dangerous weapon, -‘and then and there committed am, assault xypon the said Adolphe Ohachbrell

¶9Then, the inference is irresistible, that Adolphe Chachére was, at the *598time, in tiie store-house used as a dwelling, and in which he “ was then residing.”

¶10“ The crime of burglary known to our law is statutory,” said our predecessors in Newton’s case, 30 Ann. at page 1254: “The statute defines it, and we must, therefore, look to the statute to ascertain the essential averments of the indictment.”

¶11To this construction we have constantly adhered. Vide State vs. Spencer Jordan, 39 Ann. 340.

¶12It has often been held that a statutory offense need not be described in the language of the statute, but that it was sufficient, if all of the essential elements of the offense are distinctly and clearly set out “ in words of similar import to those employed in the statute — that is, in such words as clearly convey the real meaning of the language used in the statute.” State vs. Eams, 39 Ann. 989; State vs. Williams, 37 Ann. 776; State vs. Humphries, 35 Ann. 966; State vs. Hood, 6 Ann. 179.

¶13In the instant case the language which is employed in the indictment is of similar import to that which is employed in the statute, and we think it is entirely sufficient.

¶14Judgment affirmed.

/41/laann/596 · .json · Public domain