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← 41 So. 3d 119 - Trease v. State

41 So. 3d 119 - Trease v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2010

Citation profile

7
cited by 7 later decisions
1
states following
October 2018
most recently cited

7 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · Faretta v. California · Jones v. State · Trease v. State · 596 So. 2d 1008 - Waterhouse v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In Durocher [ v. Singletary ], 623 So.2d [482,] 483 [ (Fla. 1993) ], this Court held that capital defendants who are competent can waive postconviction counsel and postconviction proceedings, reasoning "[i]f the right to representation can be waived at trial, we see no reason why the statutory right to collateral counsel cannot also be waived." This Court explained that it "cannot deny [a death row inmate] his right to control his destiny to whatever extent remains." [ Id. ] at 484. However, under such circumstances, this Court ruled that a Faretta -type inquiry was required to ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 485. Specifically, this Court stated the following: [W]e also recognize that the state has an obligation to assure that the waiver of collateral counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, we direct the trial judge forthwith to conduct a Faretta -type evaluation of Durocher to determine if he understands the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings. If the judge finds a proper waiver by Durocher, he shall report that finding to this Court and the instant petition will be dismissed. If, however, Durocher does not understand the consequences of his decision, the judge shall report that fact to this Court and CCR will be allowed to proceed on Durocher's behalf. The attorney general's office and CCR may attend the evaluation, but may not participate unless permitted to do so by the judge. If the Faretta”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(7) If the court determines that the defendant has made the decision to dismiss pending postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel knowingly, freely, and voluntarily, the court shall enter an order dismissing all pending postconviction proceedings and discharging collateral counsel. But if the court determines that the defendant has not made the decision to dismiss pending postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel knowingly, freely, and voluntarily, the court shall enter an order denying the motion without prejudice. (8) If the court grants the motion: (A) a copy of the motion, the order, and the transcript of the hearing or hearings conducted on the motion shall be forwarded to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida within 30 days; and (B) discharged counsel shall, within 10 days after issuance of the order, file with the clerk of the circuit court 2 copies of a notice seeking review in the Supreme Court of Florida, and shall, within 20 days after the filing of the transcript, serve an initial brief. Both the defendant and the state may serve responsive briefs. Briefs shall be served as prescribed by rule 9.210. (9) If the court denies the motion, the defendant may seek review as prescribed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(b).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “If this Court were to allow Trease to reinstate his postconviction proceedings based upon a mere change of mind, there would be nothing to stop Trease from changing his mind again at a later date. In fact, based upon Trease's history, this is a likely scenario. Then, the trial court would be required to conduct another Durocher hearing because Trease has a right to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. Thereafter, Trease could again change his mind, and the trial court would be required to reinstate the postconviction proceedings. The cycle could continue indefinitely. Cf. Waterhouse v. State , 596 So.2d 1008 , 1014 (Fla. 1992) ("[A] defendant may not manipulate the proceedings by willy-nilly leaping back and forth between the choices [of self-representation and appointed counsel]." (quoting Jones v. State , 449 So.2d 253 , 259 (Fla. 1984) ) ).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.