Carpenter v. Providence Washington Insurance’s Empirical Analysis
41 U.S. 495 · 1842
Citation profile
95 federal appellate · 18 district · 93 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 269 later decisions (22 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 1997 · most notably Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance (1889), Northern Assurance Company of London v. Grand View Building Association (1902)
95 federal appellate · 18 district · 93 state decisions — followed in 33 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on The Columbia Insurance Company of Alexandria, in Error v. Joseph W. Lawrence, Who Survived Thomas Poindexter · Columbian Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence · Jeremiah Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Company
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 269 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““It is not true that because a policy is procured by misrepresentation of material facts it is therefore to be treated, in the sense of the law, as utterly void ah initio. It is merely voidable, and may be avoided by the underwriters upon due proof of the facts; but until so avoided it must be treated for all practical purposes as a subsisting policy. In this very case the policy has never, to this very day, been avoided, or surrendered to the company. It is still held by the assured, and he may, if he pleases, bring an action thereon tomorrow; and unless the underwriters should at the trial prove the misrepresentation, he will be entitled to recover . . . Indeed, we are not prepared to say that the court might not have gone farther, and have held that a policy—existing and in the hands of the insured, and not utterly void upon its very face, without any reference whatever to any extrinsic facts—should have been notified to the underwriters; even although by proofs, afforded by such extrinsic facts, it might be held in its very origin and concoction a nullity. ’ ’”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““No doubt can exist that the mortgageor and the mortgagee may each separately insure his own distinct interest in the property. But there is this important distinction between the cases, that when the mortgagee insures solely on his own account, it is but an insurance of his debt; and if his debt is afterwards paid or extinguished, the policy ceases from that time to have any operation; and even if the premises insured are subsequently destroyed by fire, he has no right to recover for the loss, for he sustains no damage thereby; neither can the mort-gageor take advantage of the policy, for he had no interest whatsoever therein. On the other hand, if the premises are destroyed by fire before any payment or extinguishment of the mortgage, the underwriters are bound to pay the amount of the debt to the mortgagee, if it does not exceed the insurance. But then upon such payment, the underwriters are entitled to an assignment of the debt from the mortgagee, and may recover the same amount from the mortgageor, either at law or in equity, according to the circumstances; for the payment of the insurance by the underwriters does not, in such a case, discharge the mortgageor from the debt, but only changes the creditor.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““The third instruction prayed the court to instruct the jury that if the Washington Insurance Company had notice, in fact, of the existence of the policy in the American office, that ‘was, in law, a compliance with the terms of the policy.’ The court refused to give the instruction as prayed; but instructed the jury that at law. whatever might be the case in equity, mere parol notice of such insurance was not,’ of itself, sufficient to comply with the requirements of the policy declared on, but that it was necessary, in case of any such prior policy, that the same should not only be notified to the company, but should be mentioned in or indorsed upon the policy; otherwise, the insurance was to" be void and of no effect. We think this instruction was perfectly correct. It merely expresses the very language and sense of the stipulation of the policy, and it can never be properly said that the stipulation in the policy is complied with, when there has been no such mention or indorsement as it positively requires, and without which it declares the policy shall henceforth be void and of no effect.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.