Volume 41 — Washington Reports

, entered September 18, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff, upon overruling a demurrer to the complaint and the refusal of the defendants to plead over, in an action for specific performance.

<p>Mortgages — Absolute Deed as a Mortgage — Escrow—Delivery Upon Default — Cutting Off Equity of Redemption. Where money was borrowed for the purpose of paying a balance due on the purchase price of premises, and a note and mortgage on the property was then given to the lender, and as part of the same transaction a deed was made to the lender and placed in escrow under an agreement that the same should be delivered in case the note was not paid when due, the deed must be held to be a mortgage although the evidence tends to show that the parties intended otherwise; since it was such in its inception, the relation of debtor and creditor existed, and the equity of redemption cannot be cut off by such an agreement as part of an original transaction between parties under no previous contractual relation.</p>

<p>Appeal — Record—Review. Error in rulings on motions for a continuance and new trial in a criminal case, or discretionary matters on sentence, cannot be reviewed on appeal in tbe absence of a bill of exceptions or statement of facts.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Review—Waiver of Error. Error cannot be assigned on tbe failure to appoint counsel for accused upon tbeir arraignment, where they were then informed of their right to counsel and stated that they did not desire any.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Separate Trials — Demand—Waiver. After the jury has been called, it is too late to demand, as a matter of right, separate trials of defendants jointly charged.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Punishment—Third Conviction. Under Laws 1903, p. 126, § 3, one who is charged and found guilty of having been twice before convicted of felonies and sentenced therefor, must on the third conviction, be punished by life imprisonment.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Yakima county, Rudkin, J., entered August 2, 1904, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, foreclosing a local improvement assessment lien.</p>

, entered August 3, 1905, in favor' of the defendants, dismissing the action, upon sustaining a demurrer to an' application of a guardian for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a warrant for a portion of a judgment in favor of a minor, paid fo* and satisfied by the minor’s attorneys.

, entered March 14, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Irwin, J., entered January 3, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury¿ in an action on contract.</p>

, entered January 23, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action by a justice of the peace to recover his salary.

, entered March 21, 1905, in favor of the defendant, after a hearing on the merits, confirming an assessment for local improvements.-

, entered March 28, 1904, in favor of the plaintiff, after a hearing on the merits, cancelling an assessment for local improvements.

<p>Appeal from au order of the superior court for King county, Griffin, <L, entered April -22, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff, denying the defendant’s application to vacate the judgment and sentence entered upon a plea of guilty, and for leave to plead further.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered April 17, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a mangle operator in a laundry.</p>

<p>Appeal and Ebbor — Briefs—Striking for Failure to Contain Findings. Appellants’ brief on appeal will not be struck out for failure to print the findings of fact when they are thereafter printed in the reply brief.</p> <p>Injunctions — Action on Bond — Attorneys Fees in Prosecuting Unsuccessful Attempt to Dissolve — Liability. Attorney’s fees paid in an unsuccessful attempt to dissolve an injunction cannot be recovered in an action upon the injunction bond, where the action of the court in refusing to dissolve the injunction was affirmed on appeal, even though the plaintiff afterwards voluntarily dismissed the injunction.</p> <p>Same^-Admissions — Voluntary Dismissal. The voluntary dismissal of an injunction does not necessarily admit that it was wrongfully sued out..</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Kennan, J., entered May 18, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to enjoin trespassing.</p>

<p>Pleadings — Amendments to Conform to Proof — Surprise. It is proper to allow an amendment to tbe complaint to conform to tbe proof that an architect’s certificate was duly given, although it was not pleaded, where it appears that on a former trial the same was offered and received in evidence, and that on the same trial the defendant offered evidence in rebuttal thereof, and could not have been surprised; especially where the order allowing the amendment recites that the objections to the evidence were not argued until after the parties had introduced their evidence and rested, and no improper advantage was obtained.</p> <p>Indemnity — Contractor’s Bond — Defenses — Contractor as Agent for Delivery. Where a surety company delivers a bond to a contractor for the purpose of closing a building contract, the contractor is made the agent of the surety for the purpose of delivering the bond, and the surety cannot claim that the bond was not given upon the contract for which it was delivered, if there was nothing on the face of the bond which would tend to put the owner upon inquiry.</p>

, entered April 6, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendants, by direction of the court, dismissing an action for injuries sustained by an employee in falling a tree.

<p>Reformation of Instruments — Mistake—Evidence—Sufficiency, A claim that there was a mistake in a contract agreeing to convey a certain number of acres of a tract of land, in not describing a certain tract, entitling a party to a reformation, is not sustained where the evidence of one witness to that effect is contradicted by the other party and by the attorney who drew up the contract.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser — Contracts — Construction — Conditional or Absolute Sale. A contract whereby the defendants undertook to redeem the land of another from certain mortgage and judgment liens, furnish him a place to live, pay him an annuity, and reconvey a quarter section thereof after full reimbursement for their expenses, amounts to an absolute and not a conditional sale to the defendants, except as to the part to be reconveyed, and that part only is held in trust for the former owner.</p> <p>Same — Rescission by Purchaser — Breach—Fraud—Failure to Keep Accounts — Effect. Where the grantees of certain premises undertook to redeem the same from mortgage and other liens, and to reconvey a part, after full reimbursement for their advances out of the rents, issues and profits of the land, the foreclosure of the mortgage in the interest of the grantees for the purpose, as claimed, of perfecting title, will not be presumed fraudulent as to the owner so as to work a forfeiture of the contract, nor will the failure to keep account of the rents, issues and profits have such effect.</p> <p>Same — Failure of Title — Excuse for Performance. Grantees Who undertake to recover a portion of the premises conveyed to them, upon reimbursement for advances made, are not freed from their obligation to reconvey by reason of a partial failure of the title of their grantor, where they acquired the title to such part at one-half its market value, which sum, at most, they could claim as an additional indebtedness against the property.</p> <p>Accounting — Contracts—Advancements—Rents and Profits of Land — -Items Chargeable. Where premises were conveyed to the defendants, who undertook to redeem the same from mortgage and other liens, and to reconvey a part after full reimbursement out of the rents, issues and profits, the defendants are not entitled upon an accounting to credit ior taxes paid or improvements made on their portion of the land, after they took possession, nor for the expense of foreclosing a mortgage on the premises incurred to enable them to gain possession of other lands; nor could they farm out the land to themselves at a profit and credit the former owner with only one-third of the crop, since they were entitled only to actual expenses.</p> <p>Same — Failure to Keep Accounts. Where grantees in a conveyance of lands, agreed to reconvey a portion of the premises upon being fully reimbursed for advances out of the net rents, issues and profits of the land, they are bound to keep proper accounts, and must be held to be fully reimbursed where no accurate accounts were kept for a period of years, except such as could be prepared from disconnected data and memory, showing many discrepancies and errors.</p>

<p>Taxation — Foreclosure of Lien — 'Summons — Subscription. Under Bal. Code, § 4882, the original summons for publication in a tax foreclosure is sufficiently “subscribed” by the attorney for the plaintiff although the signature is printed..</p> <p>Same — Notice—Summons by Publication — Newspaper Printed and Published in County — Proof—Sufficiency. Under Bal. Code, § 4878, requiring the publication of a summons to be made in a newspaper printed and published in the county, service by publication is sufficient where the paper was printed at S. in said county and sent to and distributed at I. in said county, although the proof of publication is to the effect that it was printed and published at I.</p> <p>Same — Newspaper—What Is — Evidence—Sufficiency. A paper eleven by sixteen inches in size, containing four pages of four columns each, filled with general and local advertisements, legal notices, and general and local news, issued regularly each week, with a local circulation of 300 paid subscribers in a town of about 400 people, is a newspaper of general circulation in which the publication of summons is authorized.</p> <p>Same — Residence oe Defendants — Duty of Plaintiffs to Inquire — Statute. An affidavit for the publication of a summons stating that two of the defendants are nonresidents and that their addresses are unknown, is sufficient to authorize the publication of a summons, although it was shown that the affiant knew that said defendants had acknowledged a deed before a notary of a certain county in another state, no duty devolving upon him to ascertain the addresses of the defendants by inquiry of such notary.</p> <p>Judgment — Default — Incokpobation in Judgment. It is not necessary upon taking judgment by default to enter the default in a separate order.</p> <p>Same — Date—Clekical Ebbok. A clerical error of the county clerk in recording a judgment by filling up a blank for the date six days later than the filing date is immaterial, as the date of the judg.ment was the date of its filing.</p> <p>Taxation — Fobeclosuke—Judgment—Fobm—What to Contain. Under Laws 1899, p. 99, § 18, prescribing the form for a judgment upon the foreclosure of a tax lien, and providing that the court shall order and direct the clerk to make out an order for the sale of the property, a judgment containing an order upon the treasurer to sell the tracts is a sufficient order of sale and a certified copy of the judgment signed by the judge and attested by the clerk is all that is required.</p> <p>Judgments — Vacation of Default — Neglect of Agent — Sufficiency. Nonresident owners of property sold for taxes do not show sufficient ground for vacating the judgment by showing that their agent, a resident of the state, who held the fee and owned an equitable interest in the land, and who had paid the taxes up to a certain time, promised to pay the taxes but had failed to do so.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Bell, J., entered January 7, 1905, after a hearing on the merits, denying a petition to vacate a receiver’s sale and order of confirmation.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Snell, J., entered May 9, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff, upon overruling a demurrer to the complaint, and the refusal of the defendants to plead over, in an action to quiet title.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Pierce county, Huston, J., entered April 28, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff, after a hearing on the merits, granting a temporary injunction to abate a nuisance.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court September 19, 1905, for a writ of prohibition, to the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., to prevent the discharge of a writ of garnishment.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Skagit county, Joiner, J., entered June 9, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits, dismissing an action to quiet title to lands sold for taxes.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Morris, J"., entered January 3, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of unlawful detainer.</p>

, entered June 6, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to reform an agreement as a mortgage and for an accounting. Modified.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lincoln county, Warren, J., entered February 9, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the meritsi before the court without a jury, in an action on promissory notes and to foreclose a chattel mortgage.</p>

<p>Appeal — Jurisdiction — Amount in Controversy — Legality oe Tax. A judgment against a county in favor of a taxpayer for the amount of an excessive tax in the sum of $64.56, does not affect the “legality” of a tax, within Const., art. 4, § 4, giving the court jurisdiction in such event in cases involving less than $200, where the question arose through a mere mistake of the assessor in entering the number of acres in the tract, and there was no question as to lack of power to levy the tax, or any controversy as to any rule or construction of law.</p>

, entered January 5, 1905, upon the- verdict of a jury, rendered in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a sawmill in removing a belt from a revolving shaft.

<p>Criminal Law — Jurors—Misconduct—New Trial. It is misconduct entitling the accused in a criminal case to a new trial, for a juror to separate from the body of the jury and go with a bailiff to a public drinking saloon and take a drink of intoxicating liquor, without the knowledge or consent of the judge (Rudkin and Fullerton, JJ., dissenting).</p> <p>Same — Presumption or Prejudice. Where a juror is guilty of such misconduct, it cannot be shown that the same was without prejudice by the fact that he was the last juror to consent to the verdict, since prejudice will be conclusively presumed (Rudkin and Fullerton, JJ., dissenting).</p>

, entered January 13, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee caught upon a coupling of a revolving shaft.

<p>Equity — Claim to Equitable Interest In Purchase oe Land— Fraud oe Plaintiee — Reliee in Equity. No standing in a court of equity is shown by one who fraudulently misrepresents that he is the owner of coal lands, and after securing an option for $100 for the purchase of the property at $35,000, further fraudulently represents that he has entered into a contract for its purchase at $100,000, upon which $15,000 had been paid, and thereby and by agreeing to organize a corporation and float bonds to reimburse investors for advances, secures advances to the extent of $50,000 which he converts to his own use, and refuses to either purchase the property or pay the taxes; and the persons whom he has defrauded may, to protect themselves, purchase the property independently and for their exclusive benefit, even before the time for his option has expired.</p>

, entered August 24, 1905, upon overruling a demurrer to the return to a writ of habeas corpus, remanding to custody a prisoner charged with the offense of selling railway tickets without a license.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Stevens county, Richardson, J., entered November 22, 1904, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action by a widow to recover an interest in lands patented to her divorced husband.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Bell, J., entered January 6, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for partition.</p>

<p>Insurance — Accident Policy — Construction—Exceptions—Burden of Proof. Under tbe rule that exceptions from liability in accident insurance policies must be construed strongly against tbe insurance company, the burden of proof is upon tbe insurance company to establish tbe fact that an accident happened by reason of some act that was made an exception to tbe risk, in order to avoid liability, where a death from violent injuries has been shown.</p> <p>Same — Policy—Construction. Under a provision in a policy of accident insurance exempting tbe company from liability in case of tbe death of the insured “being on any railroad bridge or right of way,” recovery may be had where the insured, at the side of the tracks, fell or was drawn under the train; since “right of way” must be construed to mean “on the track,” and not the full width of the land owned by the company.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Res Gestae. In an action upon an accident insurance policy, statements made by the deceased explaining how the accident happened and showing that it was accidental, are admissible as part of the res gestae, when made to the physician, about an hour after the accident, in the absence of his associates and •when so mangled that an amputation of both arms was necessary and death resulted within thirty-six hours.</p>

, entered May 31, 1904, in favor of tbe defendants, upon tbe verdict of a jury entered by direction of tbe court, dismissing an action for damages for false representations.

<p>Mortgages — Without Actual Acknowledgment — Validity as Between Parties — Estoppel In Equity to Question Validity. A purchase money mortgage without actual acknowledgement, signed hy the mortgagees when a certificate of acknowledgement was already filled out and signed, is valid as between the parties-or purchasers of the property with notice.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Chapman, J., entered Hovember 7, 1904, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a defective sidewalk.</p>

<p>Insurance — Receipt and Application — Conflict—Construction. Where an application for insurance upon a printed form conflicts with the statements of a written receipt, the latter controls.</p> <p>Life Insurance — Binding Receipt — Death Prior to Issuance .of Policy. Where an insurance solicitor receives the first payment on a life insurance policy and issues a written receipt reciting that the policy (to he thereafter issued) is to take effect from the date of the receipt, there was a present contract of insurance to he superseded hy the policy or terminated hy rejection of the application, although the application upon a printed form recited that the insurance was not to take effect until the policy was accepted; hence the company would be liable where the application was accepted in ignorance of an intervening accident which resulted in death before the delivery of the policy.</p> <p>Insurance — Agents—Authority. Want of authority of a soliciting agent, who received the first premium on a life insurance policy, to issue a binding receipt constituting a present contract of insurance, must be brought home to the insured in order to relieve the insurance company from liability, the general rules of agency not applying.</p>

<p>Indictment — Sunday—Judicial Notice. An information charging the defendant with carrying on the business of barbering on Sunday on a day named, which in fact was Sunday, shows with sufficient certainty that the offense was committed on Sunday, since the court will take judicial notice of the day.</p> <p>Statutes — Amendment—Title—Sufficiency. Const., art. 2, § 37, providing that an act shall not he reversed or amended by mere reference to its title but that the act reviewed must be set forth in full, has no application to the implied repeal of a former law by another on the same subject which is a complete law in itself without mention of the former act.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Special Legislation — Prohibiting Barbering on Sunday — Validity of Statute. Laws 1903, p. 68, prohibiting the business of barbering on Sunday, does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against class legislation or special privileges, nor the Federal constitutional prohibitions against abridging the privileges of a citizen or the taking of liberty or property without due process of law, even as to those who conscientiously believe in the observance of the seventh day of the week (Rudkin, J., dissenting).</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Assault with Intent to Murder — Presumptions — Instructions. Upon a prosecution for assault with intent to murder under an information charging, also, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm no considerable provocation appearing therefor, it is proper in speaking of the latter intent, to instruct the jury that every sane person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his voluntary act, although death did not ensue; since the same must be held to apply to the lesser offense only.</p> <p>Same — Charge of Assault with Razor — Evidence of Shooting— Admissibility. Under an information charging an assault with intent to murder with a deadly weapon, viz., a razor, it is proper to receive in evidence a shotgun with an empty shell found in the room of the accused, where it appears that the prosecuting witness was attacked by an unknown person who cut his throat and shot him in the back with a shotgun, the shot corresponding in size with those that had been contained in the empty shell.</p> <p>Same — Evidence of Identity — Sufficiency. There is sufficient evidence of identity to sustain a conviction of assault with intent to do bodily harm, whete it appears that the victim was cut and shot by an unidentified person, that the accused admitted to two persons that he made the assault, and a shotgun with an empty shell, that had contained shot of the same size used in the attack, was found in the room of the accused after his arrest.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered March 7, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages.</p>

order of the superior court for Spokane county, Belt, J., entered December 28, 1904, setting aside the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, and granting a new trial on motion of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a defective sidewalk.

, entered September 6, 1904, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, enjoining the obstruction of an alley.

, entered March 3, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff, after a hearing on the merits, denying defendant’s petition, for the vacation of a default judgment.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Hatch, J., entered June 30, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for partition.</p>

, entered December 14, 1904, upon sustaining an objection to the introduction of testimony and withdrawing the case from the jury, denying an application for a writ of mandate to compel an irrigation company to deliver water.

<p>Trial — Setting Cause for Trial — Discretion—Request for Continuance. The action of the trial court in setting a cause for trial on a certain day will not be reviewed in the absence of an abuse of discretion, or any application for a continuance.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error — Damages—Special Verdict. In an action for damages for personal injuries, error in admitting immaterial evidence as to an item of damage is harmless where a special verdict was rendered and the damages for such item were eliminated and deducted from the judgment.</p> <p>Same — Physicians Services — Evidence of Value by Amount Paid — Admissibility. In an action for damages for personal injuries, the evidence of the amount paid to a physician for medical attendance is some evidence of the reasonable value of the services, and its admission is therefore not ground for a reversal.</p> <p>Same — Health Prior to Injury — Evidence—Admissibility. In an action for damages for personal injuries, evidence of the physical condition of the plaintiff prior to the accident is admissible.</p> <p>Appeal — Review — Evidence of Matters Admitted — Harmless Error. In an action for personal injuries sustained in a fall upon a defective sidewalk, it is not prejudicial error to allow a witness to testify to the hoards being loose, although the same was immaterial.</p> <p>Damages — Permanent Injuries — Evidence—Mortuary Tables— Admissibility. In an action for damages for personal injuries, where there was evidence that the injury was permanent, mortuary tables showing the plaintiff’s expectancy of life are admissible.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations • — ■ Negligence — Streets — Condition of Walk Prior to Injury — Admissibility—Complaint—Sufficiency. In an action for personal injuries sustained through a defect in a sidewalk, the allegation iu the complaint that the city carelessly neglected to nail down the planks knowing of the unsafe condition of the walk, is sufficient to authorize evidence of constructive notice on the part of the city by the existence of defects prior to the time of the accident.</p>

, -entered March 17, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff for possession, and in favor of the defendant for the value of improvements, in an action of ejectment, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury.

, entered July 6, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action against a surety for contribution.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chehalis county, Irwin, J., entered December 12, 1904, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before' the court without a jury, restraining the vacation of a street.</p>

lis county, Irwin, J., entered April 10, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of forcible entry and detainer.

, entered April 29, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in-favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits, in an action for personal injuries sustained while riding on a logging engine.

, entered January 17, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on a building contract.

, entered February 17, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, iu an action to foreclose a mortgage.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of thq superior court for Lincoln county, Heal, J., entered January J, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, enjoining a sale of land under execution and removing cloud from title.</p>

<p>Master and Servant — Negligence—Injury to Employee Caught in Cogwheels — Contributory Negligence — When Question por Jury. A planer-man who is in a kneeling position with head and shoulders under a planer, a large and dangerous machine, is not guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law. in suddenly throwing his hand into unguarded cogs, known to him, in an effort to get from, under the machine, in momentary forgetfulness of the danger, when a fellow servant starts the machine in motion without giving.him any warning.</p> <p>Master and Servant — Contributory Negligence. Contributory negligence is a question for the jury if men might properly differ as to whether the plaintiff had acted as a man of ordinary prudence would have done under the same circumstances.</p> <p>Same — Proximate Cause — Exposed Condition op Cogwheels a Contributing Element — Liability op Master. The maintenance of a planer with exposed cogs which could have been easily covered, and with defects whereby the cogs were likely to start automatically upon application of the idler, is the proximate canse of an injury to a planer-man who was injured thereby, while cleaning out under the machine, although the negligence of a fellow servant, who started the machine without giving any warning, contributed to the result; and such contributory cause does not relieve the defendant from liability.</p> <p>Same — Assumption op Risks — Unknown Dangers — Defects in Machine Causing Unexpected Starting — Question por Jury. A planer-man who has worked upon a planer hut five days and has no knowledge of a defect whereby the cogs may start automatically upon the application of the idler, does not assume the risk from injury resulting from the known unguarded condition of the cogs, where there was ample time for him to have avoided the injury if the cogs had not automatically started.</p>

, entered February 13, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee caught in unguarded cogwheels.

<p>Appeal — Dismissal — Appealable Obders — Striking Complaint for Misjoinder of Causes of Action. An order striking a complaint from tlie files for the reason that it contained two or more causes of action not separately stated is not a final order and is not appeal-able.</p>

, entered October 10, 1904, upon findings in favor of an intervener, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, awarding the ownership of funds in possession of a garnishee.

, entered June 3, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendants by direction of the court, in an action of ejectment.

<p>Appeal — Record — Condemnation — Inspection of Premises —■ Knowledge Gained Not Brought Up — Verdict—Review. A view by the jury in a condemnation case does not preclude the appellate court from a review of the questions of fact.</p> <p>Eminent Domain — Evidence of Values — Sufficiency to Sustain Verdict — View by Jury — New Trial — Discretion of Lower Court. The verdict by a jury assessing damages for land appropriated by a city for a street at $300 per acre should not be set aside as contrary to the evidence from the fact that the lowest estimate of the value by any witness on either side was $400 per acre, where there was other evidence bearing upon the value, the jury viewed the property, and the trial court refused to set aside the verdict on that ground (Rudkin and Hadley, JJ., dissenting).</p> <p>Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Morris, J., entered July 6, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury assessing tbe damages in a condemnation proceeding, after a trial on the merits. Affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement of Pacts — Peace of Certification. Where no amendments are proposed to a statement of facts in a case tried before a visiting judge, the same may he certified outside of the county or judicial district in which the case was tried.</p> <p>Insurance — Loss by Piee — Policy — Clause for Subrogation Against Party Causing Pike — Release by Insured as Breach of Subrogation Clause. Where a clause in a fire insurance policy provides that the insurer shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against any.person whose act or neglect caused the fire, and after the issuance of the policy the insured entered into a contract with a railroad company releasing it from all liability for fires caused by it, there can be no recovery upon the policy for a loss by a fire caused by sparks from a passing engine of said railroad company.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pacific county, Rice, J., entered September 27, 1905, upon overruling a demurrer to defendant’s answer, dismissing an action, to enjoin the operation of a fisb trap.</p>

, entered June 22, 1905, after a hearing upon affidavits, restraining the transfer of a liquor license, and directing the delivery of the certificate of license to the plaintiff as receiver.

<p>Receivers — Claims for Labor — Allowance—Corporations—Employment of Stockholders — Meetings—Resolutions—Effect. Upon the receivership of an insolvent corporation, a general creditor cannot defeat the allowance of preferred claims for labor, performed by various stockholders in the capacity of employees within six months from the appointment of the receiver, by an objection to the validity of a stockholder’s resolution fixing certain compensation for such stockholders, where there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that the resolution was never acted upon by the corporation, and was waived by the stockholders, and that they were regularly credited with the reasonable value of the services rendered by them; and the conclusion of law that they were entitled to preferred claims was proper.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Kittitas county, Rudkin, J., entered January 26, 1904, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action, of ejectment.</p>

<p>Appeal — Review—Verdict Upon Conflicting Evidence. The verdict of a jury upon conflicting ( evidence upon an issue as to negligence is conclusive on the supreme court after the refusal of the lower court to grant a new trial.</p> <p>Master and Servant — Negligence—Injury to Miner by Pall of Rock- — -Furnishing Props — Evidence—Sufeiciency. In an action for personal injuries sustained hy a miner from the alleged fall of rock in a mine, the question of the negligence of the defendant is for tne jury, where there was evidence tha,t no props were furnished to the plaintiff, as required hy statute, although he had demanded the same; and the defendant is not entitled to a nonsuit hy reason of conflicting testimony to the effect that there were sufficient props provided, and that the plaintiff had stated at the time that his injury was due to other causes.</p> <p>Same — Violation of Statutory Duty — Assumption of Risk. An employee^ in a mine does not assume the risks of injury hy reason of defendant’s failure to perform the statutory duty of furnishing sufficient props.</p> <p>Same — Contributory Negligence — Instructions. An instruction in a personal injury case to the effect that the defendant would be liable for an injury caused by its negligence, if the plaintiff was “without any greater want of care, prudence and skill . . . than was reasonably to be expected from a person of ordinary care,” etc., is not prejudicially erroneous, although not as clear as it should have been upon the subject of contributory negligence.</p>

, entered January 3, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Stevens county, Carey, J.,. entered April 12, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for a broker’s commission for the sale of land.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of tbe superior court for Spokane county, Huneke^ J., entered June 12, 1905, on motion of tbe defendants, quashing a summons and tbe service thereof.</p>

<p>Bills and Notes — One op Makers Surety Only — Pboop—Parol Evidence — Competency. A co-maker of a promissory note, who signs as surety only, may show such fact by parol evidence and that the payee had knowledge thereof.</p> <p>Principal and Surety — Release op Surety — Consideration—Payment op Part — Suppiciency. An agreement for an immediate payment of part of a debt is sufficient consideration for the release of a surety from obligation to pay the remainder.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Release op Surety by Parol — Statute Requiring Writing — Construction. Under Laws 1899, p. 361, providing that a “renunciation” of a negotiable instrument must be in writing, a surety thereon is not entitled to show that he had been released by parol.</p>

<p>Vendor and Purchaser — Attempted Rescission by Vendee — D© fect in Title — Failure to Tender Reconveyance — Liability to As’ signee of Vendor foe Balance of Purchase Price. Where a conveyance of land was made subject to approval of tbe title by tbe vendee, in consideration of $500 in cash, $500 to be paid on approving tbe title, and tbe balance by tbe discharge of a debt due from tbe vendor to tbe vendee, and pending tbe approval of tbe title the vendor assigns tbe contract for tbe $500 still due, to a third person, tbe vendee cannot, on finding the title defective, rescind tbe contract without tendering a reconveyance; and where rescission was attempted but found impracticable because of tbe vendor’s -inability to return tbe money paid, and the vendee sold the land in an attempt to reimburse himself for the money paid and the previous indebtedness, he affirms the contract, and is liable to the assignee thereof for the balance due on the purchase price (Root, J., dissenting).</p>

<p>Master and Servant — Negligence-Injury to Servant From Defective Lathe — Assumption of Risks — Promise to Repair — Liability of Master. An operator of a turning lathe is, by the master’s ■ promise to repair, relieved from the assumption of risks by reason of a broken socket, where it appears that the superintendent told him to take the socket to the office and it would be repaired, which he did several times', but returned with it and used it unrepaired upon an urgent request of the foreman, upon his promise to repair it as soon as the job was completed, and where the danger was not so imminent that a workman of ordinary prudence would have regarded it so hazardous as to have refused.</p> <p>Damages — For Personal Injuries — Excessive Verdict — Remission. A verdict of $5,500 for personal injuries sustained by an operator of a turning lathe, a married man forty-seven years of age, and capable of earning $3,50 per day, is excessive, and should reduced to $3,500, where the only result of the accident was hernia, and testimony of the experts was to the effect that a great majority of people afflicted with this disorder are able to carry on their regular occupations with the aid of trusses, and that a large per cent of such cases are permanently cured by an operation, and where the plaintiff was otherwise in normal health and testified that he had since the injury done some light work.</p>

, entered July 1, 1905, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for damage to lots by reason of a change of grade.

<p>Insurance — Loss by Fire — Proofs of Loss — Waiver—Evidence-Sufficiency. A fire insurance company waives sworn proofs of loss called for by the policy, where immediately after the fire the insur'ed notified thp officers of the company of the loss and inquired what was necessary to be done in order to have the loss adjusted, and followed out instructions given to secure invoices, and subsequently the company refused to pay anything on the loss without giving any reason therefor; since there was an evident intent to mislead the insured by the giving of incorrect instructions.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court January 6, 1906, for a writ of mandate1 to the superior court for’ Douglas .county, Steiner, J., to compel the settlement and certification of a statement of facts.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Skagit county, Joiner, J., entered May 8, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for personal injuries sustained through a fall on a defective sidewalk.</p>

, J., entered October 20, 1904, affirming, on appeal from a justice’s court,- a judgment in favor of a laborer on public work, for time in excess of the period p-re-scribed by ordinance as a day’s work.

, entered August 16, and October 18, 1904-, appointing a guardian for an incompetent person, and refusing to vacate the same.

, entered April 26, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on a promissory note.

<p>Homesteads — Executions—Sale—Practice—Objections—Exemption — Considering at Hearing on Confirmation. Upon tbe sale under execution of real estate of tbe value of less than $1,000, duly claimed by tbe judgment debtor as a homestead prior to sale pursuant to tbe homestead law of 1895, tbe sale is void unless made under appraisement and in tbe manner required by such law, and should not be confirmed.</p> <p>Same — Sale on General Execution — Failure to Comply With Homestead Act — Validity. Tbe question whether real estate sold under execution was at tbe time exempt as tbe homestead of tbe judgment debtor may be beard and determined by tbe court upon tbe motion for confirmation of tbe sale.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chehalis county, Irwin, J., entered September 25, 1905, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for personal injuries. Affirmed.</p>

, entered June 2, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for specific performance.

, entered June 26, 1905, upon sustaining a demurrer to an information, dismissing a prosecution for obtaining property under false pretenses.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Poindexter, L, entered December 11, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, dismissing an action for a divorce.</p>

, entered June 7, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

<p>Appeal — Jurisdiction—Appealable Orders — Order Refusing to Vacate Appointment of Receiver. An order denying a motion to vacate the appointment oí a receiver is an appealable order.</p> <p>Receivers — For Insolvent Corporation — Appointment at Instance of Simple Contract Creditor. A receiver' may be appointed for an insolvent corporation upon the suit of a simple contract creditor upon a showing of insolvency, and without any showing that judgment and execution would he a useless formality.</p> <p>Same — Jurisdiction to Appoint — Waiver of Notice of Application by de Facto President. The jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for an insolvent corporation upon the waiver of notice of the application by the president of the corporation, does not depend upon the consent of the president, nor upon the question whether the acting president had title to the office or authority to waive notice.</p> <p>Same — Collusion—Evidence. The charge of collusion between the president and officers of a corporation, resulting in the appointment of a receiver, is not sustained by proof to the effect that they preferred the appointment of.a receiver to the securing of liens and the sale of the property.</p> <p>Same — Insolvency—Findings—Evidence—Sueeiciency. Findings of the trial court upon an application for the appointment of a receiver of an insolvent mining corporation, that the corporation was insolvent, will be sustained on appeal where the evidence is conflicting and proof of insolvency not convincing, and where the witnesses who had had the management and control of the corporation testified that it was insolvent, and none of the parties interested offered to pay the small claim for which the suit was brought.</p>

, entered March 14, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action against railroad companies for damage to buildings caused by the construction of a tunnel.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered October 30, 1905, upon motion of the defendants, quashing the sea-vice of summons.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered July 1, 1905, in favor of an administrator, requiring the defendant to answer interrogatories touching property of the estate alleged to he in his possession, and committing him to jail for refusal to answer.</p>

, entered April 29, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff for damages for the death of an employee, a power bolter’s helper, falling upon a unguarded saw.

, entered January 16, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury in an action for partition and an accounting.

, entered April 19, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on a judgment.

, entered June 23, 1903, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before tbe court without a jury, in an action for tbe specific performance of a copartnership agreement.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered June 2, 1905, upon findings in favor iof the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered June 8, 1905, upon granting defendant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, dismissing an action for personal injuries sustained by a driver in a collision of furniture vans.</p>

, entered November 6, 1905, dismissing a prosecution for the crime of rape, upon sustaining a demurrer to the information.

<p>Master and Servant — Negligence—Unguarded Chipper — Assumption oe Risk — Question for Jury. Upon a conflict in the testimony as to whether a saw, used for the purpose of chipping off the top part of the larger logs, could be advantageously guarded, under the factory act, the question is one of fact for the jury and not of law for the court, where there was ample testimony, if believed, to establish the fact that it could be guarded.</p> <p>Same — Contributory Negligence. Where a workman comes in contact with unguarded machinery which he is not operating, the rule as to his contributory negligence is different from the rule where the machinery is under his immediate control.</p> <p>Same — Knowledge op Danger — Contributory Negligence — Question por Jury. Whether a sawyer, who was injured in giving a signal by throwing up his hand, coming in contact with the revolving knives of a chipper over the sawyer’s pit, is guilty of contributory negligence, is a question for the jury, where it appears that the distance from the floor to the chipper was seven or eight feet, that ten inches of sawdust had accumulated in the floor of the pit, but the foreman did not have the same removed when it was called to his attention at the noon-hour, and where the other methods of giving the signal were by a rope of which the plaintiff had no knowledge, or by leaving his position and going around the end of the log; since a person is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law simply because he had previous knowledge of the danger.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Hatch, J., entered Hovember 10, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a. trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quiet title.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chelan county, Steiner, J., entered June 8, 1905, in favor of the plaintiff for damages and the cancellation of a deed.</p>

county, Denney, J., entered January 7, 1905, in favor of the relator, granting a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a municipal reassessment for a local improvement.

, entered May 18, 1905, in favor of the petitioner, after a hearing on the merits, revoking letters of administration, upon application of next of kin.

, entered January 18, 1905, in favor of the defendants, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action to vacate a judgment.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Morris, J., entered February 9, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on a promissory note.</p>

<p>Boundaries — Establishment—Evidence. The monuments established by the official surveys control the field notes and other proof of the location of a government corner, hut in the absence of other evidence the field notes control.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Field Notes. Where a government corner is lost, and the surveyor who established the corner fifty years ago is unable to explain the many material discrepancies between his own field notes and those returned to his superior officer, the certified copy of the field notes recorded in the surveyor general’s office should have greater weight and will not he overturned by evidence of the field notes of the surveyor.</p> <p>Same — Appoinment oe Commissioners — Discretion. The appointment of commissioners under Bal. Code, § 5668, to establish a disputed boundary, rests in the discretion of the trial court, and is not subject to review on appeal.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Declarations—Competency. In an action to establish a disputed boundary, declarations of the appellant’s deceased father are inadmissible.</p>

, entered March 27, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of replevin.

, entered July 11, 1905, upon sustaining a demurrer to plaintiffs amended complaint, dismissing an action on an endowment clause of a policy of life insurance.

, entered Hovemher 6, 1905, in favor of the defendant, denying a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the return of a pro rata portion of the excess of a local improvement fund, upon sustaining a demurrer to the affidavit.

<p>Criminal Law — Error Coram Nobis — Petition — Sufficiency. An application for a writ of comm nobis is insufficient where the writ is sought to set aside a conviction of murder because of the commission of perjury of a juror upon his voir dire, not discovered until after the decision of the case on appeal, where the petition was not verified by the applicant, nor supported by affidavits; since the qualifications of the juror had been adjudicated, and the writ cannot be employed to set aside verdicts on account of perjury.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Yakima county, Kigg, J., entered June 13, 1905, in favor of the defendant, dismissing an action to quiet title, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

<p>Limitations op Actions — By Minor to Recover Real Property— Statute — When Begins to Run. Under Bal. Code, § 4809, tbe time during which the owner of land is a minor is not a part of the time limited by Bal. Code, §§ 4796, 4797, requiring actions for the possession of land to be commenced within ten years; and an action commenced within four years after the minor attains his majority is within time.</p> <p>Adverse Possession — Payment oe Taxes. Where title to land is claimed by adverse possession and the payment of taxes for seven years, under Bal. Code, § 5503, the claim of title must be made in good faith.</p> <p>Adverse Possession — Claim and Color oe Title — Good Faith— Purchase Pendente Lite. One who purchases land pending an action to recover possession and quiet the title and, after the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction against his predecessor, holds possession in defiance of the judgment, is without color of title or good faith, although he was not served with process and no notice of Us pendens was filed.</p> <p>Lis Pendens — Action to Recover Possession oe Real Estate. Notice of the pendency of an action to recover the possession of real estate is not necessary under Bal. Code, §§ 5515, 5518, providing that such actions shall not be affected by alienation pendente lite, and that judgment as to the right of possession shall be conclusive on the parties, and those claiming under them after the commencement of the action, which sections are not superseded or controlled by the general statute, Bal. Code, § 4887, providing for the filing of notice of lis pendens in certain forms of actions.</p>

<p>Appeal from au order of the superior court for Spokane county, Poindexter, J., entered September 20, 1905, correcting an error in a judgment upon motion of the judgment creditors.</p>

, entered June 17, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, a passenger on a street car, for damages inflicted by a dog permitted to remain in the car, contrary to the rules of the company.

<p>Appeal — Record—Statement oe Pacts. In the absence of a statement of facts errors based upon the evidence cannot be reviewed.</p> <p>Same — Extension op Time por Piling. Error in refusing an extension of time for filing a statement of facts will not be reviewed where the entire 90 days within which the statement could be served and filed has expired without the filing of any statement.</p> <p>Damages — Technical Breach — Nominal Damages. In an action for the breach of a contract to deliver wood, a finding of a technical breach in that the entire quantity was not delivered supports a judgment for nominal damages only, where there was no finding as to the value of the wood or the damage sustained.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Trial — Misconduct or Counsel — Correction. Statements of counsel for the state, on argument to the jury, which were outside of the record, will not constitute prejudicial error entitling the accused to a new trial, where the only statement objected to was in relation to the failure of the defense to produce witnesses at the preliminary examination, and the court upon request, fully and explicitly instructed the jury to disregard this and all statements outside of the record, and no exceptions were taKen to the ruling of the court.</p>

, entered February 11, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

<p>Criminal Law — Obtaining Money Under False Pretenses — Evidence — Proof of Other Crimes. Upon a charge of obtaining money upon false pretenses by means of making a collection, upon a day named, falsely representing that the accused was an agent of the prosecuting witness and authorized to collect his accounts, evidence of similar collections from other parties under similar fraudulent pretenses, is inadmissible for the purpose of showing intent, or for any purpose, where there is nothing unusual or extraordinary in the means employed and no connection between the collections made.</p> <p>Same — Defenses—Advice of Attorney. Upon a prosecution for obtaining money under false pretenses, it is competent for the defendant to prove that he had collected money as agent for the prosecuting witness under the advice of an attorney, believing that he had the right to do so, hut only when it appears that the advice was given after a full and fair statement of all the facts, made in good faith.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered May 5, 1905, upon the verdict, of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for $13,500 damages for the wrongful death of an employee.</p>

<p>Taxation — Fobeclosube—Appeal—Bond—Time fob Filins. An appeal from an order refusing to vacate a tax foreclosure is governed by the general appeal law and not by the special provisions of the revenue act, Laws 1903, p. 75, § 4, providing the conditions and time for filing an appeal bond upon an appeal from a tax foreclosure judgment; hence the bond need not be served and filed at the time of giving notice of the appeal.</p> <p>Taxation — Fobeclosube — Summons fob Publication — Sufficiency. A summons for publication in a tax foreclosure, requiring the defendant “to appear within sixty days (after the service of this summons exclusive of the first publication of summons), which will be on the 6th day of June, 1901,” is not a substantial compliance with Laws 1901, p. 383, requiring the summons to contain a direction to the owner to appear within 60 days after the date of the first publication of the summons exclusive of the said first publication; and the timé within which the defendant is required to appear being necessary, the defect is fatal to the validity of the judgment.</p>

<p>Triad — Comment on Pacts. In an action for personal injuries against a town, where tbe attorney for tbe defendant, in bis argument to tbe jury, stated tbat tbe plaintiff bad presented ber claim to tbe town, it is unlawful comment upon tbe evidence, in violation of Const., art. 4, § 16, for tbe court, in sustaining tbe objection to sucb argument, to state in tbe presence of tbe jury tbat there was no evidence of tbe presentment to tbe town of any claim, when in fact there was evidence tbat a claim, verbal or written, bad been presented to tbe town.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Mason oo-unty, Linn, J., entered April 21, 1905, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action upon a promissory note.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for King county, Albertson, J,, entered April 8, 1905, upon findings in favor of tbe defendant, after a trial on tbe merits before tbe court without a jury, in an action to recover money received by mistake.</p>

, entered July 8, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered, in favor of the defendant by direction of the court, after a trial on the merits, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in a fall from a street car.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Jefferson county, Hatch, J., entered June 2, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court -without a jury, dismissing an action against stockholders, brought by a creditor of an insolvent corporation to recover unpaid stock subscriptions.</p>

, entered June 17, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages sustained by a tenant through the seepage of water.

, entered April 28, 1905, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a contract of employment.

, entered July 27, 1905, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial before the court without a jury, dismissing on the merits an action to rescind a contract for the sale of land.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Spokane county, Bftmeket, J\, entered May 27, 1905, granting a new trial for error in instructions, after the verdict of a jury in favor of the defendant, in an action for damages from a fire set out on the defendant’s right of way.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for Stevens county, Carey, J., entered July 10, 1905, in favor of tbe defendants, upon granting a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s case, in an action to recover damages for malpractice.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chehalis county, Irwin, J., entered January 23, 1905.</p>

, entered December 13, 1904, in favor of the defendant, dismissing on the merits an action for services as an architect, upon sustaining a challenge to the evidence.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Bell, J., entered June 20, 1904.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Chelan county, Steiner, J., entered March 3, 1905.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Huston, J., entered January 31, 1905.</p>