Volume 41 — Washington Reports, Second Series

[1] INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY — AVERMENTS IN LANGUAGE OF STATUTE. It is sufficient, in charging a crime, to follow the language of the statute, where such crime is there defined and the language used is adequate to apprise the accused with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation. [2] SAME — No PRESUMPTIONS FAVORING. There is no presumption in favor of a pleading charging a crime; and such a pleading must be definite and certain. [3] SAME — "COMMON UNDERSTANDING" RULE. While it is not fatal to an information that the precise language of the statute was not followed, words conveying the same meaning and import must be employed, and a person of common understanding should be able to read what is intended and to understand the charge, under the statute, from the face of the information; however, before this rule can be applied, it must first be determined whether or not the information charges all of the statutory elements of the particular crime involved. [4] FISH — CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS — RESISTING ARREST BY FISHERIES INSPECTOR — SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION. An information charging that, at a specified place and on a specified day, the defendant "did knowingly and willfully resist the arrest by a Fisheries Inspector," does not charge a crime under RCW 75.08.190, providing that any fisheries inspector shall have authority to arrest without warrant any person in the act of violating any of the provisions of the fisheries code and regulations, and that if any person knowingly or willfully resists or opposes such officer in the discharge of his duties he shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor; since it cannot be deduced from the information that the arrest was one which the officer was entitled to make, for it is not alleged whether or not he had a warrant, it is not alleged that the officer was acting "in the discharge of his duties," and it is not alleged that the defendant when arrested was "in the act of violating any of the provisions" of the fisheries code or regulations. [5] STATUTES — CONSTRUCTION — PENAL STATUTES. A criminal statute can reach no further than the limitations prescribed by its words. [1] See 27 Am. Jur. 659-665.

[1] CRIMINAL LAW — TRIAL — APPEAL — MOTION TO DISMISS — WAIVER. In a criminal prosecution, where the defendant did not stand upon his motion to dismiss at the close of the state's case but introduced evidence in his own behalf, he thereby waived his motion and cannot urge the court's denial thereof as error. [2] SAME — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — FEDERAL CONSTITUTION — FIFTH AMENDMENT — NOT APPLICABLE TO POWERS OF STATE. The fifth amendment to the Federal constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the Federal government and has no application to the powers of the state. [3] SAME — EVIDENCE — CONFESSIONS — VOLUNTARY CHARACTER. In a criminal prosecution, it was not error for the trial court to admit in evidence written statements made and signed by the defendant which constituted extrajudicial confessions, where the jury was entitled to believe that no threats were made nor inducements offered to obtain them and there is nothing in the record to suggest a violation of his constitutional rights; the fact that his inquisitors failed to advise him that he might remain silent and refuse to incriminate himself not being a violation of such rights. [4] APPEAL AND ERROR — BRIEFS — SETTING OUT INSTRUCTIONS — NECESSITY. Instructions not set out in the appellant's brief will not be considered. [5] CRIMINAL LAW — APPEAL — REVIEW — HARMLESS ERROR — INSTRUCTIONS. In a prosecution for assault in the second degree, in which the information charged a beating by the defendant with his hands and fists, held that, taking into consideration all the instructions given by the court, the defendant was not prejudiced by the use of the words "either with or without a weapon" in an instruction defining assault in the second degree. [6] ASSAULT AND BATTERY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY. In a prosecution for assault in the second degree, in which the information charged a beating by the defendant with his hands and fists, held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty. [7] CRIMINAL LAW — EVIDENCE — CORPUS DELICTI — CONFESSIONS — INDEPENDENT PROOF. The extrajudicial confession of a person charged with the commission of a crime, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish the <italic>corpus delicti;</italic> however, if there is independent proof thereof, such confession may then be considered in connection therewith, and the <italic>corpus</italic> <italic>delicti</italic> may thus be established by a combination of the independent proof and the confession.<page_number>Page 615</page_number> [8] SAME — TRIAL — ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL — COMMENT ON SUBJECT OPENED UP BY DEFENDANT. In a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor had a right, in his argument to the jury, to refer to another criminal offense committed by the defendant, where it appears that the subject had been opened up by the defendant in his cross-examination of a state witness; and where it appears that such remarks were germane to an issue in the case, it cannot be held that they prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. [7] See 127 A.L.R. 1130; 20 Am. Jur. 1092.

[1] OFFICERS — REMOVAL — RECALL — BALLOT SYNOPSIS AS PART OF RECALL PETITIONS. Under RCW 29.82.020, when a city clerk prepared a ballot synopsis of charges demanding a recall against the mayor of the city, and there was no challenge of that synopsis by either the mayor or the parties who filed the charges, it became a part of the recall petitions. [2] SAME — RECALL — SUFFICIENCY OF CHARGES — TIME FOR ATTACKING. In such a case, where it appears that some of the charges were sufficient and some insufficient, and the mayor did not challenge the sufficiency of the charges at a time when the insufficient charges could have been stricken and reference to them eliminated from the ballot synopsis, and the recall petitions were circulated, signed, and canvassed, the mayor cannot complain of the fact that some voters may have been induced to sign the recall petition because of the insufficient charges. [3] SAME. After recall petitions have been circulated, signed, and canvassed, only the complete failure of all of the charges to meet the statutory requirements can justify enjoining the election; one charge meeting the statutory requirement being sufficient. [4] SAME — RECALL — SUFFICIENCY OF CHARGES. In proceedings for the recall of a mayor, a charge that he had appointed a water commissioner who was not qualified or able to discharge the duties of that office was sufficient; as was likewise the charge that between specified dates he had permitted three houses of prostitution to operate openly and notoriously in the city. [5] SAME — RECALL — VALIDITY OF PROCEEDINGS. A mayor is not entitled to enjoin the holding of a recall election, where it appears that there was a valid and sufficient charge filed against him, that there was no timely challenge to the inclusion of certain insufficient charges in the ballot synopsis, and that the requisite number of valid signatures was on the recall petitions. [6] SAME — RECALL — NOTICE TO OFFICER BEING RECALLED. The recall statute requires no notice to the officer being recalled of any step in the recall procedure except notice of the date of the canvassing of the petitions as to the validity of the signatures thereon; and such notice is not the beginning of the "cause of complaint" which the legislature had in mind when it enacted RCW 29.82.160, providing<page_number>Page 890</page_number> that any proceeding to prevent the performance of any act not in compliance with the recall statutes shall be begun within ten days from the time the cause of complaint arises. [1] See 106 A.L.R. 555; 28 Am. Jur. 182.