x999-2" type="concurrence">

*617Concurring Opinion by

HARRELL, J.,

which BATTAGLIA and BARBERA, JJ., join.

I concur fully with the analysis in the Majority opinion regarding affirming Tarray’s conviction for exploitation of a vulnerable adult based on the deception modality of committing the crime. I write separately, however, to register my disappointment with the Majority opinion’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence for the jury also to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tarray exerted undue influence over her victim.

A reader may wonder (reasonably) why I write separately where the conviction at issue is affirmed, a result to which I subscribe. I write because it is my view that it is especially important prospectively for the Court carefully and correctly to interpret this statute. This is the Court’s first opportunity to consider the Exploitation of a Vulnerable Adult statute, Maryland Code (2002 RepLVol., 2008 Supp.), Criminal Law Article, § 8-801.1 Faced with a large aging population in this country and in our State, I predict that the courts likely will see an increase in prosecutions involving exploitation of vulnerable adults. While advanced age does not, in and of itself, necessarily equate with vulnerability, vulnerability often accompanies aging.2

I would affirm Tarray’s conviction for exploitation of a vulnerable adult also on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to prove undue influence.

[W]e review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial by determining whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, supported the conviction of [Appellant], such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

*618Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 76-77, 935 A.2d 421, 431 (2007). “It is not the province of an appellate court to retry the case; rather, we review the evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable to the State.” Id. at 77, 935 A.2d at 431. “We give ‘due regard to the [jury’s] findings of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.’ ” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 534, 823 A.2d 664, 668 (2003) (quoting Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002)).

The Majority concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support Tarray’s conviction on the ground that Tarray unduly influenced Wright. In so concluding, the Majority necessarily resolves that the jury could not have concluded reasonably, from the totality of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, that Tarray influenced unduly Wright to give her thousands of dollars over a period of seven months. Section 8-801 defines undue influence as “domination and influence amounting to force and coercion exercised by another person to such an extent that a vulnerable adult was prevented from exercising free judgment and choice.” § 8-801(a)(7)(i).

Although the transactions involving the truck and the home occurred outside the time period specified in the criminal information, there remained sufficient evidence that could convince a rational fact finder of Tarray’s guilt under the undue influence standard. For example, as noted by the Majority opinion (Maj. Op. at 611-12, 979 A.2d at 739), Wright expressed in his testimony that he agreed to the demanded increases in Tarray’s salary because he felt as if he was between a rock and a hard place. He explained that he was in that position because if he “didn’t have [Tarray] ... where would I go?” At that point in his testimony, the trial judge ordered a recess because the witness had become “extremely emotional.” When testimony resumed, Wright stated that, in order to survive, he needed help in his house. He also indicated that he lost’ contact with his family as a result of the separation from his wife.

*619The Majority characterizes Wright’s position, “in between a rock and a hard place,” as including a choice and that the manner in which he disposed of his property was the result of inferentially bad judgment, rather than “force and coercion.” Maj. Op. at 611-12, 979 A.2d at 739. Although that is not an unreasonable conclusion, it equally was reasonable for the jury to infer from his testimony and demeanor on the witness stand that Wright believed he did not have a choice as a result of Tarray’s manipulation and influence, despite what he said on the witness stand. Wright is paraplegic and needs assistance with dressing himself, preparing food, basic toilet functions, and getting in and out of bed. The jury could have concluded reasonably that Wright believed if he did not give Tarray what she wanted, she would have left him and he would not have anyone else to care for him. Put in context, a rational jury could have concluded that, although Wright may have “wanted” to give her more money so that she would continue caring for him, her manipulative demands (in his situation) prevented him from exercising free judgment and choice because she led him to believe she would leave if he did not comply with her demands and that he would not be able to find anyone else to care for him.

Instead, the Majority usurps the jury’s function and appropriates to itself the role of an appellate jury. On a sufficiency of the evidence question, our duty is to “give ‘due regard to the [jury’s! findings of fact, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.’ ” Smith, 374 Md. at 534, 823 A.2d at 668 (quoting Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002)). The Majority opinion, however, substitutes itself in place of the jury. Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of undue influence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, although I concur with the judgment of the Majority opinion and its affirmance of the relevant conviction on deception grounds, I would further hold that there was *620sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on the ground of undue influence.

Judges BATTAGLIA and BARBERA authorize me to state that they join this concurrence.

. All citations, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Criminal Law Article.

. A vulnerable adult will not always be a senior citizen. Wright, the victim here, was only fifty years of age at the time of the offense here.

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