¶1Dissenting Opinion by
¶2I agree with the majority that “[t]he analytical focus of a Rule 4-215 argument is at the point in the proceeding when the waiver is accepted (and relevant events leading up to that acceptance)!.]” In my opinion, however, this Court should overrule its prior holdings that every “failure to give proper advisements requires reversal.” Assume, for example, a defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter who argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 4-215(a)(3) when the defendant stated that he wanted to fire his lawyer and represent himself at trial. If the record shows that the trial judge (1) told the defendant that the maximum penalty for voluntary manslaughter is 50 years imprisonment, but (2) complied with every other requirement in the rule, I would not grant a new trial on the ground that the defendant was incorrectly advised of the allowable penalties.
¶3In the case at bar, the Petitioner elected to represent himself at a trial involving charges that included false imprisonment. The record shows that the Petitioner was told that (1) false imprisonment is “a common law offense,” (2) “[t]here’s no legal cap you can get on false imprisonment,” and (3) if he were convicted of false imprisonment, he could be sentenced to any “period of incarceration that does not offend the cruel and unusual punishment provision in the Constitu*645tion.” Under these circumstances, I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “[Reversing [the Petitioner’s] conviction would simply reward [Petitioner’s] post hoc regret about his considered choice to discharge counsel, without providing any additional protection for the right to counsel.” Brye v. State, 181 Md.App. 105, 123, 955 A.2d 821, 831 (2008).