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411 F.2d 592

Docket No. 27048

Thomas v. Peterson Marine Service, Inc.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided May 15, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1969.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1969-05-15

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The undisputed facts reflect that [the plaintiff] lacked the status necessary to sue . . . for negligence under the Jones Act, the plaintiff must be a member of a crew and this means he must be more or less permanently attached to a vessel or fleet of specified vessels. * * * The undisputed facts in this case show that Thomas was a shore-based worker hired by Peterson Marine, an independent contractor, to do a special job in the hold of the S/T Mobil Acme and that he was not employed by the owner of the vessel and was not in any sense permanently attached to that vessel. As between the Jones Act and the Longshoremen’s Act, the latter is his exclusive remedy.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Burns v. Anchor-Wate Co.

Applies 33 U.S.C. § 901

Relies on Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki · Reed v. Steamship Yaka · Murphy v. Houma Well Service

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1969-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently December 1988

17 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

150196919701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Summary Calendar.

¶2Charles R. Maloney, John A. Salvag-gio, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

¶3*593Richard C. Baldwin, Adams & Reese, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.

¶4Before BROWN, Chief Judge, THORNBERRY and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6Peterson Marine Service, the defendant-appellee, employed Freddie Thomas, the plaintiff-appellant, to work in the hold of the S/T MOBIL ACME, a vessel owned by Mobil Oil Corporation. At the time of appellant’s injury, he was scooping excess coconut oil from the hold and his employer Peterson Marine had exclusive control of that part of the ship. He first asserted a claim under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) but then shifted ground and filed a complaint under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) and general maritime law. The district court granted summary judgment for Peterson Marine Service and we affirm.1

¶7Appellant says he changed forums before litigating his initial claim because his allegation that he was a longshoreman qualified to receive benefits under the Longshoremen’s Act was denied by his employer. Assuming that his employer considered him to be a seaman rather than a longshoreman, he then filed the instant suit whereupon, to his consternation, his employer denied that he was a seaman and moved for summary judgment. The employer says its only purpose in controverting appellant’s initial claim to be a longshoreman was to secure a formal hearing and adjudication of the injured employee’s status by the Deputy Commissioner. Whatever may explain so much uncertainty, the jockeying for forum must now end: Thomas is a longshoreman and should proceed anew under the Longshoremens Act.

¶8The undisputed facts reflect that he lacked the status necessary to sue under the Jones Act. To sue for negligence under the Jones Act, the plaintiff must be a member of a crew and this means he must be more or less permanently attached to a vessel or fleet of specified vessels. Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 5th Cir. 1960, 280 F.2d 523. The undisputed facts in this case show that Thomas was a shore-based worker hired by Peterson Marine, an independent contractor, to do a special job in the hold of the S/T MOBIL ACME and that he was not employed by the owner of the vessel and was not in any sense permanently attached to that vessel. As between the Jones Act and the Longshoremen’s Act, the latter is his exclusive remedy.

¶9To exhaust appellant’s possibilities for a suit in admiralty against his employer, we hold that as a longshoreman he is not entitled to sue Peterson Marine for the unseaworthiness of the vessel under the doctrine fashioned for longshoremen in Seas Shipping Company v. Sieracki, 1946, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 and Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 1963, 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed.2d 448. An injured longshoreman who was doing work traditionally done by seamen can maintain an action for unseaworthiness, but such action must be against the vessel in rent, or the owner of the vessel and cannot go directly against a stevedore-employer having no ownership or operational interest in the vessel. We so held in Watson v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 5th Cir. 1967, 374 F.2d 946.2

¶10The summary judgment is in all respects affirmed.

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