Hill’s Empirical Analysis
Citation profile
27 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 130 later decisions — most recently August 2021 · most notably 537 F. Supp. 2d 644 - Gonzalez v. Astrue (2008), 423 F. App'x 234 - Frank Perano v. Township of Tilden (2011)
27 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. · Foman v. Davis · Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle · Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 Will County Illinois · Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 130 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““it is generally unnecessary to analyze laws which burden the exercise of First Amendment rights by a class of persons under the equal protection guarantee, because the substantive guarantees of the [First] Amendment serve as the strongest protection against the limitation of these rights.” If a law passes muster under the First Amendment it is also likely to be upheld under the Equal Protection clause. Likewise, if a law violates First Amendment rights there is no need to resort to the Equal Protection clause to redress the constitutional violation.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We reject the [plaintiffs’] contention that courts may never grant summary judgment on either the second or third steps of this analysis. Although we have often noted that the first prong of the First Amendment retaliation test presents questions of law for the court while the second and third prongs present questions of fact for the jury, e.g., Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 195 ), only genuine questions of fact should be determined by the jury. For example, in Ambrose v. Township of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir.2002), we held that judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) should have been granted to the defendant where the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that his protected activity was a substantial factor in his suspension. The same principle applies in the summary judgment context under Rule 56.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[w]e follow a well-established three-step test to evaluate a public employee’s claim of retaliation for engaging in activ- , ity protected under the,First Amend ment. First, the employee must show that the activity is in fact protected. Second, the employee must shew that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Third, the employer may defeat the employee’s claim by demonstrating that the same adverse action would have taken place in the absence of the protected conduct.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.